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1147 
POLICE OR PIRATES? REFORMING WASHINGTON’S 
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE SYSTEM 
Jasmin Chigbrow* 
Abstract: Civil asset forfeiture laws permit police officers to seize property they suspect is 
connected to criminal activity and sell or retain the property for the police department’s use. 
In many states, including Washington, civil forfeiture occurs independent of any criminal 
case—many property owners are never charged with the offense police allege occurred. 
Because the government is not required to file criminal charges, property owners facing civil 
forfeiture lack the constitutional safeguards normally guaranteed to defendants in the criminal 
justice system: the right to an attorney, the presumption of innocence, the government’s burden 
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and protection from double jeopardy, among 
others. 
Washington’s civil forfeiture laws currently provide minimal legal protection for property 
owners and contain a profit motive for police to pursue property forfeiture. Washington 
agencies need only prove property is connected to illegal activity by a preponderance of the 
evidence to forfeit, or permanently keep, the item. This is the second lowest burden of proof 
for civil forfeiture in the country. Moreover, Washington state law allows agencies to retain 
90% of the proceeds from forfeited property. Washington also utilizes administrative 
forfeitures, which are nonjudicial proceedings handled by an officer of the seizing agency. 
These provisions combine to create serious due process concerns in Washington’s civil 
forfeiture system. 
This Comment addresses these concerns and proposes a reform of the statutory scheme to 
eliminate civil forfeiture completely by replacing it with a criminal forfeiture system like New 
Mexico’s. Under New Mexico law, property owners must be convicted of a crime before their 
property can be forfeited and all forfeiture proceeds are transferred to the state’s general fund. 
By funneling forfeitures through the criminal system and eliminating any profit motive, New 
Mexico property owners are provided with legal protections that are severely lacking in 
Washington’s current civil forfeiture system. Washington should implement similar reforms 
to protect the due process rights of property owners and prevent forfeiture abuse by law 
enforcement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Enlisted . . . as a legitimate auxiliary tool in the so-called war on 
drugs, the legal doctrines of civil asset forfeiture have since been 
perverted to serve an entirely improper function in our 
democratic system of government—official confiscation from 
 
*J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. I would like to thank 
Professor Mary Fan and Professor Hugh Spitzer for their time and constructive feedback in evaluating 
this Comment. Additional thanks to Washington Law Review members who put in countless hours to 
make this piece the best it can be. Lastly, thank you to my friends and family for all their love and 
support.  
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innocent citizens of their money and property with little or no due 
process of law or judicial protection.1 
 
An elderly man keeps his entire life savings in cash around his home. 
His parents lived through the Great Depression and instilled in him a deep 
distrust of banks. At age seventy-nine, the man finally decides to open a 
bank account because he worries about the disastrous consequences of a 
home invasion. He gives his daughter a Tupperware container with over 
$82,000 in neatly stacked bills inside and asks her to deposit the cash into 
a joint account for the two of them. The daughter verifies it is legal to 
carry such a large amount of cash on to her domestic flight home the next 
day. But as she makes her way through airport security, she is stopped and 
questioned about the cash. She explains it is her father’s life savings he 
gave her to bring home to deposit. The security agents suspect the 
daughter is lying. They call her father for corroboration, but he gives 
details that do not quite match the daughter’s story. She tries to explain 
her father’s fragile mental health. Unconvinced, the agent simply says 
“[w]e’re seizing the cash.”2 The daughter is frightened as she watches 
strangers walk away with every dollar her father saved. Worst of all, she 
later receives a letter from the government notifying her of its intent to 
permanently keep the cash. Neither the daughter nor her father did 
anything wrong; they broke no law. Yet, civil asset forfeiture statutes gave 
the agents full legal justification to retain the cash.3 
These events occurred at the Pittsburgh International Airport in August 
2019.4 Terry Rolin asked his daughter to deposit his life savings in a bank 
for safekeeping when federal agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) seized the money.5 This set off an exhaustive legal battle to regain 
 
1. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE? 6 
(1995). 
2. Justin Jouvenal, The DEA Seized Her Father’s Life Savings at an Airport Without Alleging Any 




3. DEA Asset Forfeiture, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/operations/asset-
forfeiture [https://perma.cc/2B85-6MEH] (“To seize property, DEA agents must have probable cause 
(the same legal standard needed to arrest someone) and obtain a warrant from a judge (with some 
exceptions).” (emphasis added)).  
4. See Jouvenal, supra note 2; Torsten Ove, Retiree’s $82,000 Seized by Feds at Airport to Be 
Returned, but Lawsuit Continues, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2020, 7:59 AM), https://www.post-
gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2020/03/04/Retiree-s-82-000-seized-by-feds-at-airport-to-be-
returned-but-lawsuit-continues/stories/202003040116 [https://perma.cc/33GT-UXNP]. 
5. See Jouvenal, supra note 2. 
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possession of the cash.6 Fortunately for Mr. Rolin, a non-profit 
organization stepped in to advocate on his behalf.7 Still, seven months 
passed before the federal government finally agreed to return Mr. Rolin’s 
cash;8 however, others are not so lucky. 
Criminals should not profit off their wrongdoing.9 This is the oft-
repeated reasoning behind civil asset forfeiture laws that permit law 
enforcement agencies to take and keep property they believe is connected 
to a crime. At first, this reasoning appears logical: taking away profits 
derived from criminal activity is punitive and should disincentivize 
lawbreaking behavior. When police suspect an individual committed a 
crime, civil forfeiture laws allow police to seize property they believe 
“either facilitated a crime or was acquired as a result of criminal 
activity.”10 This often includes cash, weapons, electronics, and vehicles, 
but it can involve houses and real property as well.11 Generally, if property 
owners are unable to successfully contest forfeiture or if they do not 
respond to an agency’s notice of forfeiture before a given deadline, the 
property and all of its ownership rights are officially forfeited to the 
government.12 
However, on closer inspection, the reasoning behind civil forfeiture 
falters. The irony of lauding asset forfeiture for its punitive and crime 
deterrent effects is that property owners facing these proceedings may 
have never committed a crime. This was the case for Mr. Rolin and his 
daughter. As the name implies, civil asset forfeiture is considered a civil 
proceeding.13 Unlike a criminal case, no arrest is required for civil 
 
6. See id.; Ove, supra note 4. 
7. Ove, supra note 4. 
8. The government did not agree to pay interest on the cash. See id.  
9. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974) (“Forfeiture of 
conveyances that have been used—and may be used again—in violation of the narcotics laws fosters 
the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of the 
conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable.”). 
10. Civil Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
11. LISA KNEPPER, JENNIFER MCDONALD, KATHY SANCHEZ & ELYSE SMITH POHL, POLICING FOR 
PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 19 (Mindy Menjou ed., 3d ed. 2020).  
12. For a sampling of various civil forfeiture standards and requirements, see 18 U.S.C. § 983(c); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-16-12 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712A-10 (West 2021); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:2612 (2020); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5822 (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-530 (2021); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.05 (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.1 (2021); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-705 (2021); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.555 
(West 2021); WYO. STAT. ANN § 35-7-1049 (2021).  
13. See Civil Law, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/engli 
sh/civil-law [https://perma.cc/4BMT-9SE7] (“Civil law is the part of a country’s set of laws which is 
concerned with the private affairs of citizens, for example, marriage and property ownership, rather 
than with crime.”).  
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forfeiture to occur.14 The government does not need to file formal criminal 
charges, let alone prove them beyond a reasonable doubt.15 For example, 
Massachusetts police only need probable cause to forfeit property they 
believe is connected to illegal drug activity.16 Probable cause is the lowest 
burden of proof to forfeit in the country17 and requires “more than a bare 
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.”18 The 
probable cause standard allows law enforcement agencies to confiscate 
property based on minimal grounds. In Washington, the burden of proof 
is just slightly higher: officers must show the property at issue is 
connected to unlawful enterprise by a preponderance of the evidence.19 
The preponderance of the evidence standard is the second lowest standard 
of proof for forfeiture in the country and requires that it is “more probably 
true than not true” that property is connected to illegal activity.20 
Essentially, the government has to show a 51% likelihood that the 
property is connected to wrongdoing to divest ownership.21 
The ease with which police can take property combines with a 
problematic profit motive to increase agency reliance on civil forfeiture.22 
Law enforcement agencies may choose to sell forfeited property at a 
public auction (frequently conducted online) or keep the property for 
department use.23 If an agency auctions the property, it typically retains 
between 80–100% of the proceeds.24 Agencies use auction proceeds to 
 
14. Rishi Batra, Resolving Civil Forfeiture Disputes, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 399, 401 (2017). 
15. Adam Crepelle, Probable Cause to Plunder: Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Problems It 
Creates, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 315, 315 (2017). 
16. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d) (West 2021); Policing for Profit: Massachusetts, INST. 
FOR JUST., https://www.ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/?state=MA [https://perma.cc/9GMR-
KVKG] [hereinafter IJ MA].  
17. IJ MA, supra note 16.  
18. Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
19. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2020) (setting the burden of proof for forfeiture 
related to illegal drug activity). Washington has several different civil forfeiture statutes governing 
different areas of unlawful behavior, but they all impose a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
See infra notes 236–241 and accompanying text.  
20. 6 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. – CIV. § 21.01 (7th ed. 2019).  
21. See Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d 593, 608, 260 P.3d 857, 865 (2011) 
(“[T]he standard of confidence required is a ‘preponderance,’ or more likely than not, or more than 
50 percent.”). 
22. See Crepelle, supra note 15, at 334–35. 
23. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(7)(a)–(b) (giving agencies the choice to retain or sell 
forfeited property); see also Elisabeth Leamy, How to Score Big at Government Auctions, on 




24. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 34.  
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supplement their budgets, so higher value items are lucrative for police.25 
These proceeds can then be applied toward anything from bonuses, 
trainings, and travel costs, to squad cars, helicopters, and military-style 
tactical vehicles.26 If an agency elects to keep the property (typically in 
the case of a vehicle), it can use this new asset for undercover operations 
and training exercises.27 Often, the only limitation set by the law is that 
retained property must be put to “official use.”28 This feature promotes 
application of civil forfeiture laws because it rewards agencies for 
successful seizures.29 
Recognizing the potential for abuse, over half the states in the country 
recently reformed their forfeiture laws.30 Changes include reducing profit 
motives by decreasing the percentage of forfeiture proceeds that agencies 
are allowed to retain, improving legal protections for property owners, 
raising the burden of proof on the government, closing loopholes that 
allow state and local agencies to circumvent state law by forfeiting 
property via federal programs, and increasing agency reporting 
requirements.31 New Mexico currently leads the country in reform after 
completely abolishing civil forfeiture and replacing it with a criminal 
forfeiture system in 2015.32 This means that property owners in New 
Mexico must be convicted of the underlying crime to justify forfeiture of 
their property.33 These reforms help protect owners’ rights and prevent 
 
25. Id. 
26. See William Freivogel, No Drugs, No Crime and Just Pennies for School: How Police Use 
Civil Asset Forfeiture, PULITZER CTR. (Feb. 18, 2019), https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/no-drugs-
no-crime-and-just-pennies-school-how-police-use-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/SML5-
J2AY]; Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazin
e/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/ABB4-YUMU]. 
27. Bill Bird, Cars Seized in Crimes Generate Lucrative Income for Police, Governments, CHI. 
TRIB.: NAPERVILLE SUN (July 23, 2016, 10:46 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/nape 
rville-sun/ct-nvs-naperville-vehicle-seizure-law-st-0717-20160723-story.html [https://perma.cc/C2P 
C-8RCW]. 
28. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(7)(a) (“When property is forfeited under this chapter 
the board or seizing law enforcement agency may . . . [r]etain it for official use or upon application 
by any law enforcement agency of this state release such property to such agency for the exclusive 
use of enforcing the provisions of this chapter.”). 
29. See Crepelle, supra note 15, at 315–16 (“Placing law enforcement in a revenue generating role 
is problematic because it creates tension between raising money and protecting the public.”). 
30. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31 (“[Since 2015,] 32 states and the federal government 
have adopted measures limiting forfeiture or altering its procedures.”). 
31. See id. 
32. See Policing for Profit: New Mexico, INST. FOR JUST., https://www.ij.org/report/policing-for-
profit-3/?state=NM [https://perma.cc/2X2C-Z2ZC] [hereinafter IJ NM] (grading New Mexico’s 
forfeiture laws with an A—the highest grade of any state—due to its enhanced protections and higher 
burden of proof requirements). 
33. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4(2) (LexisNexis 2021). 
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forfeiture abuse.34 
Although many states are making progress with forfeiture reform, some 
still enforce laws that encourage agencies to take property for their own 
benefit—frequently at the expense of innocent property owners with no 
involvement in criminal activity.35 This Comment proposes a major 
restructuring of Washington law to abolish civil forfeiture entirely, 
implement a strict criminal forfeiture system, and eliminate financial 
incentives to forfeit. In Part I, this Comment traces the history of civil 
forfeiture laws and describes its modern application. Part II addresses 
current criticisms of civil forfeiture laws. In Part III, Washington’s 
approach to civil forfeiture is contrasted against New Mexico’s Forfeiture 
Act.36 In Part IV, this Comment proposes Washington reform its laws to 
adopt a criminal forfeiture system like New Mexico’s. These proposed 
changes will protect the due process rights of property owners and prevent 
forfeiture abuse by law enforcement. 37 
I. CIVIL FORFEITURE THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
Civil forfeiture is not a new concept, although its current application 
differs significantly from historical practice.38 The philosophical roots of 
forfeiture law extend back to Old Testament scripture.39 The idea that “[i]f 
a bull gores a man or woman to death, the bull is to be stoned to 
death . . . [b]ut the owner of the bull will not be held responsible”40 
became the basis for the theory that property itself may be guilty.41 
Medieval Britain then incorporated the theory of “guilty” property into its 
common law with the requirement of a deodand.42 A deodand was 
confiscated property that caused a person’s death, the proceeds of which 
 
34. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 7. 
35. See Crepelle, supra note 15, at 330. 
36. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2015).  
37. Rob Poggenklass, Reform Virginia’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws to Remove the Profit Incentive 
and Curtail the Abuse of Power, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 75, 99 (2016).  
38. See, e.g., Leonard v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848–50 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting 
the denial of certiorari) (describing how modern civil forfeiture differs from its historical 
background).  
39. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 n.5 (1998) (citing Exodus 21:28) (“The 
‘guilty property’ theory behind in rem forfeiture can be traced to the Bible, which describes property 
being sacrificed to God as a means of atoning for an offense.”). 
40. Exodus 21:28. 
41. See, e.g., In re Various Items of Pers. Prop., 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (describing the legal 
fiction of guilty property).  
42. See John L. Worrall, Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a 
Budgetary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 171, 173–74 (2001). 
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were forfeited to the royal family.43 
Over time, forfeiture diverged from its biblical origins and became a 
popular enforcement mechanism in British trade and navigation laws.44 
The American colonies followed suit and enacted laws authorizing 
forfeiture for maritime transgressions involving customs, piracy, and 
various admiralty laws.45 Maritime and trade-related violations remained 
the basis for civil forfeiture for centuries until legislators began enacting 
new forfeiture statutes targeting illegal drug networks in the late twentieth 
century to combat the “War on Drugs.”46 Drug crime prevention continues 
to be the purported objective of most modern civil forfeiture laws.47 To 
facilitate these developments in forfeiture application, federal and state 
laws incorporated clauses allowing police agencies to retain proceeds and 
simplify the forfeiture process through administrative action.48 These laws 
paved the way for a major expansion in forfeiture usage and enabled 
American law enforcement agencies to bring in nearly $70 billion dollars 
in forfeiture revenue since 2000.49 
A. Origins of Civil Forfeiture 
The genesis of civil forfeiture laws traces back to the scriptural notion 
of a deodand.50 As United States Supreme Court Justice William J. 
Brennan described in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,51 
“[t]he origins of the deodand are traceable to Biblical and pre-Judeo-
Christian practices, which reflected the view that the instrument of death 
was accused and that religious expiation was required.”52 The word 
deodand comes from “deodandum,” which essentially means “given to 
 
43. Teresa Sutton, The Nature of the Early Law of Deodand, 30 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 9, 9 (1999). 
44. See Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2461 (2016). 
45. Id. at 2464–65. 
46. Id. at 2450. 
47. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from 
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 79 (1996). 
48. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9.  
49. See id. at 15. 
50. See Sean M. Grove, Comment, How the Government Can ‘Come and Take It’: Asset Forfeiture 
and How Texas Should Change Its Practice, 3 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 121, 123 (2016). 
51. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
52. Id. at 681. It is worth noting that some critics take issue with Justice Brennan’s historical 
association between the deodand and modern civil forfeiture, preferring instead to cabin deodands to 
their specific religious application in accidental deaths and pointing to some evidence that English 
courts reject a connection between the two concepts. See, e.g., Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, 
at 94 (“There is little evidence, however, that modern forfeiture law descended from deodand . . . .”). 
The merits of this historical debate are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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God.”53 Under English common law, when an accidental death occurred, 
the value of the object that caused the death would be forfeited to the 
Crown as a deodand.54 The object owner’s personal liability was 
immaterial.55 For example, if a person accidentally sustained a fatal fall 
off their neighbor’s horse in medieval England, the horse’s value would 
have been appraised and transferred as a deodand to the King.56 Described 
as the “price of blood,”57 the Crown would then apply the deodand 
towards funeral proceedings for the victim or towards other charitable 
purposes.58 Although the deodand tradition went on for centuries, the 
religious underpinnings were eventually excised so the object’s value 
would be forfeited to the Crown as a “penalty for carelessness” to provide 
royal revenue.59 
The late United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
described forfeiture as the last vestige of the common law concept of the 
deodand.60 Similar to its historical applications, modern applications of 
civil forfeiture view the object used in or derived from a criminal act as 
“guilty,” rather than the object’s owner.61 This is why forfeiture is 
established through in rem proceedings against the property itself rather 
than in personam proceedings against the property owner.62 In rem 
proceedings derive from the Latin phrase meaning “against a thing” and 
they “determin[e] the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons 
generally with respect to that thing.”63 In rem forfeiture actions concern 
the status of the property police allege is connected to a crime.64 Forfeiture 
 
53. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE, COMPRISING THE OFFICE AND 
AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 156 (1795). 
54. State v. One 1990 Honda Accord, N.J. Registration No. HRB-20D, VIN 
No. 1HGCB7659LA063293 & Four Hundred Twenty Dollars, 695 A.2d 303, 305 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1997). 
55. Id. 
56. See Sutton, supra note 43, at 12–13. 
57. Id. at 9. 
58. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974). 
59. Id.  
60. One 1990 Honda Accord, 695 A.2d at 305 (citing O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 25–
30 (1923)). 
61. Jack F. Nevin, Tellevik v. Real Property: Washington’s Constitutional Dilemma, 29 GONZ. L. 
REV. 303, 306 (1993) (“Civil forfeiture is an in rem civil proceeding in which property is proceeded 
against as the defendant premised on the legal fiction that the property is guilty.”). 
62. David Benjamin Ross, Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction that Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 259, 269 n.80 (2000) (“An action in personam is one that seeks to determine the rights and 
interests of the parties involved, whereas an action in rem proceeds against the property itself to 
determine whether the property has ‘committed’ an act of which it is guilty.”). 
63. In rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64. See Commonwealth v. 605 Univ. Drive, 104 A.3d 411, 423 (Pa. 2014).  
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case names include the government agency pursuing forfeiture and a 
description of the property itself—for example, City of Walla Walla v. 
$401,333.4465 or State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler.66 The 
property owner’s name is not included because “[t]he thing is here 
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached 
primarily to the thing.”67 This twist of legal fiction accounts for why 
property owners challenging forfeiture may have to defend the object by 
convincing an adjudicator the property was not connected to illegal 
activity.68 Essentially, they are arguing their property should be found 
“not guilty.”69 
While modern civil forfeiture laws appear to descend from the deodand 
tradition, the United States never officially adopted this common law 
concept.70 The forfeiture laws in the American colonies and later the 
United States were more directly influenced by the Navigation Acts of 
England.71 English courts strictly construed these mid-seventeenth 
century admiralty statutes to protect the English maritime industry.72 
Statutory violations justified forfeiture of an entire ship and its cargo 
through in rem proceedings.73 
Similar to English law, pre-twentieth century American law authorized 
forfeiture of ships and the goods they transported when their captain or 
crew violated maritime or customs laws.74 Consistent with modern 
applications of civil forfeiture, early American courts did not require a 
criminal conviction for forfeiture75 and common law expressly held that 
courts should pay “[no] regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or 
responsibility of the owner thereof.”76 This disregard for the property 
 
65. 164 Wash. App. 236, 262 P.3d 1239 (2011). 
66. 215 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1974).  
67. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).  
68. The qualifier “may” is used here because in some jurisdictions, the burden of proof is on the 
government to prove the property is subject to forfeiture, i.e., “guilty” through its relationship to 
illegal activity, rather than on the property owner to prove the property’s innocence. See, e.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2020) (“In all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement 
agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”). 
69. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 93. 
70. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). 
71. See Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18 (Eng.). The Navigation Act of 1660 was just one of 
several trade-related acts enacted in the United Kingdom during the seventeenth century that 
permitted forfeiture. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 95–98 (describing the impact 
English forfeiture laws had on early American forfeiture laws). 
72. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 95–96. 
73. Id. 
74. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683. 
75. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 93. 
76. The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844). 
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owner’s personal liability stemmed “from the necessity of the case, as the 
only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an 
indemnity to the injured party.”77 The courts believed that in these 
maritime cases (frequently involving piracy), where vessel owners were 
often unknown or located abroad, forfeiting the ship and cargo was the 
sole method of enforcing the law.78 
Eventually, courts began utilizing forfeiture in cases arising outside of 
maritime and customs laws. In Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States,79 the 
federal government seized a “distillery, the distilled spirits, and distilling 
apparatus” as well as the parcel of land the items were located on after the 
lessee of the property committed fraud and evaded paying federal taxes 
on the liquor he was distilling.80 The Supreme Court of the United States 
upheld forfeiture of the seized items and the real property to penalize the 
lessee for their liquor tax violations.81 This case laid the groundwork for 
the modern expansion of civil forfeiture by using forfeiture as a 
punishment for domestic law violations. 
B. Civil Forfeiture in Modern America 
Unlike civil forfeiture prior to the 1970s, modern applications typically 
target property owners suspected of drug crimes.82 For example, a college 
student had $11,000 in cash seized from his luggage at an airport in 
Kentucky.83 The student tried explaining to officials that the money was 
for his tuition, but the mere presence of a large amount of cash allowed 
them to initiate forfeiture under suspicion of drug trafficking.84 The 
federal government never brought formal drug charges and only agreed to 
return the money after a three year-long legal battle.85 In another example 
of modern forfeiture, police in Oklahoma stopped a driver for a broken 
taillight and seized $50,000 cash after a police dog indicated the possible 
 
77. Id. 
78. See Rachel L. Stuteville, Comment, Reverse Robin Hood: The Tale of How Texas Law 
Enforcement Has Used Civil Asset Forfeiture to Take from Property Owners and Pad the Pockets of 
Local Government—The Righteous Hunt for Reform Is on, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1169, 1178–79 
(2014). 
79. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).  
80. Id. at 397.  
81. Id. at 399. 
82. See Stillman, supra note 26. 
83. Nick Wing, Feds Swiped $11,000 from an Innocent Student. Now, They’re Paying Him Back 
with Interest., HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2016, 4:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/charles-
clarke-civil-forfeiture_n_583f2470e4b0c68e047e52ec [https://perma.cc/YZ3X-7ZRP]. 
84. Id. 
85. Id.  
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presence of drugs in the driver’s car.86 The driver explained he was the 
manager of a Christian rock band raising money for schools and 
orphanages in Asia.87 Even though this story was fully corroborated, the 
government initiated forfeiture proceedings to retain the money and 
charged the band manager with a felony for acquiring proceeds from drug 
activity.88 After a legal non-profit stepped in to represent the band 
manager, the prosecutor dismissed the felony charge for lack of evidence 
and returned the cash several months later.89 In Arizona, a seventy-six 
year-old man pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell 
for having fifteen cannabis plants on his property.90 Although he paid a 
$25,000 fine and served six days in jail, he still faced the loss of his 
twenty-six acre ranch, house, two vehicles, and other personal property to 
civil forfeiture.91 Pro-forfeiture legislation significantly increased the 
frequency of situations like these and turned modern forfeiture into a 
multi-billion-dollar industry for law enforcement agencies across the 
country.92 
1. Current Federal and State Legislation 
Although civil forfeiture laws have been on the books since America’s 
founding, stories like those above were not common until the later decades 
of the twentieth century when the government began using forfeiture as a 
tool to fight drug crime.93 Beginning in the 1970s and extending into the 
1980s, federal and state governments ramped up forfeiture legislation as 
part of the “War on Drugs.”94 New statutes gave law enforcement the 
 
86. Darpana Sheth, Police Are Seizing Billions in Property from People Never Charged with 
Crimes. It Must End, TIME (July 28, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://time.com/4878195/civil-asset-forfeiture-
jeff-sessions/ [https://perma.cc/E4E8-HFZ4]. 
87. Id. 
88. Chris Fuchs, Months After $53,000 Seized, Oklahoma County Returns Donations to Christian 




90. Ariz. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Arizona: Civil Asset Forfeiture, VIMEO (Jan. 2, 2017, 
6:23 PM), https://vimeo.com/197829505 [https://perma.cc/6ZKL-SYC2].  
91. Id. 
92. J. Justin Wilson, New Report Finds Civil Forfeiture Rakes in Billions Each Year, Does Not 
Fight Crime, INST. FOR JUST. (Dec. 15, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/new-report-finds-civil-
forfeiture-rakes-in-billions-each-year-does-not-fight-crime-2/ [https://perma.cc/LQW4-D76W]. 
93. See Worrall, supra note 42, at 172 (“During the height of the drug war the Asset Forfeiture 
Program routinely oversaw amounts larger than half a billion dollars each year.”) (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted). 
94. David Osgood, Comment, Crime and Punishment and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture, Double 
Jeopardy and the War on Drugs, 71 WASH. L. REV. 489, 489 (1996). 
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ability to seize and forfeit property to hit alleged drug traffickers where it 
hurt—their wallets.95 The new statutes also allowed seizing agencies to 
retain the proceeds derived from forfeited assets.96 This profit motive 
incentivizes officers to seize high value items like cash, cars, and homes.97 
To further promote application, modern legislation tends to make the 
civil forfeiture process easy for the seizing agency. Seventeen states98 
(including Washington),99 the District of Columbia,100 and the federal 
government101 utilize “administrative forfeiture.” In these nonjudicial 
civil actions, the agency seeking forfeiture is not required to formally file 
a complaint or petition the court for review.102 Instead, the agency must 
notify the property owner of its intent to forfeit, explain the relevant 
administrative procedure, and identify the statutory deadline to contest 
forfeiture.103 If owners do not contest, they forfeit their property by 
default—automatically transferring their ownership rights to the seizing 
agency without ever stepping foot in a courtroom or involving a judicial 
officer.104 When owners do contest forfeiture, they are channeled through 
a relatively informal administrative hearing. A member of the seizing 
agency or a government attorney may determine the outcome of the 
hearing.105 This raises the potential for bias in the proceedings because the 
adjudicator is affiliated with the party seeking forfeiture. Additionally, 
some jurisdictions do not allow appeals from these hearings due to 
conflicting deadlines for judicial and administrative forfeiture review.106 
 
95. Mary Murphy, Note, Race and Civil Asset Forfeiture: A Disparate Impact Hypothesis, 16 TEX. 
J.C.L. & C.R. 77, 80 (2010). 
96. See Batra, supra note 14, at 401–02. 
97. See Stillman, supra note 82. 
98. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 196 n.76. 
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2020). 
100. D.C. CODE § 41-305 (2021). 
101. 18 U.S.C. § 983; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607–09. 
102. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 23. 
103. Id.  
104. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(4) (“If no person notifies the seizing law 
enforcement agency in writing of the person’s claim of ownership or right to possession of items 
specified in subsection (1)(d), (g), or (h) of this section within forty-five days of the service of notice 
from the seizing agency in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, 
the item seized shall be deemed forfeited.”). 
105. See, e.g., id. § 69.50.505(5) (explaining the claim will be heard before the “chief law 
enforcement officer of the seizing agency” or an administrative law judge, but allowing the property 
owner the option of removing the matter to a circuit court); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 712A-10(6)–(8) 
(West 2021) (assigning the attorney general the power to hear and decide administrative forfeiture 
hearings). 
106. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-10(4); In re Forfeiture of $34,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 
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Without the ability to appeal, these property owners are left without 
further legal recourse.107 
Every jurisdiction has its own procedural requirements for property 
owners contesting forfeiture. For example, the federal government 
requires owners facing administrative forfeiture to file a claim with the 
seizing agency that identifies the property and states their interest under 
oath.108 Once an owner asserts their claim, the federal agency must initiate 
the formal judicial process by filing a civil complaint in the appropriate 
federal district court within ninety days or the property will be released 
back to the property owner.109 Other jurisdictions require owners to pay a 
fee when they file their claim110 or to post a cost bond of either a specified 
statutory amount or a percentage of the disputed property’s value.111 This 
bond covers the government’s expenses accrued in defending the 
forfeiture if the property owner is unsuccessful in their challenge.112 If the 
property owner prevails on their claim, the bond money is typically 
returned to the owner.113 
 
96 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 (D. Or. 2000) (“This case is a belated challenge to a completed 
administrative forfeiture by a claimant who failed to comply with the claim and cost bond 
requirements [for judicial forfeiture review].”). 
107. See, e.g., Forfeiture of $34,905.00, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (holding that a property owner had 
“relinquished his right to file a forfeiture claim” after failing to comply with procedural requirements 
and dismissing the owner’s claim). 
108. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(C).  
109. Id. §§ 983(a)(3)(A)–(B). The federal government may also choose to add the forfeiture 
allegation to a criminal indictment and proceed with forfeiture through the criminal justice system. 
See id. § 983(a)(3)(C). 
110. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 8 (2020) (requiring law enforcement to give notice 
to owners that their seized vehicle will be automatically forfeited if they do not file a lawsuit to claim 
it and serve the prosecuting attorney within sixty days). Minnesota’s current filing fee for vehicles 
worth less than $15,000 is $65; their current filing fee for vehicles worth more than $15,000 is $285. 
See District Court Fees, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/Court-
Fees/District-Court-Fees.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2021). A proposed bill currently under 
consideration by the Minnesota Legislature that would eliminate the forfeiture filing fee for property 
owners states that “an average of $226,022 in forfeiture filing fee revenue is collected each fiscal 
year” by Minnesota courts. KELLY MOLLER, JUDICIARY FIN. & CIV. L. COMM., HF75 - 0 - 
FORFEITURE LIMITED, INNOCENT OWNER RECOVERY, PUB. SAFETY DEP’T (2021), 
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/docs/q0YI3BcSmUiAkqZ3mAe2MQ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GJQ9-FGEW]. 
111. See, e.g., Asset Forfeiture Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF HAW. CRIM. JUST. DIV., 
https://ag.hawaii.gov/cjd/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/M2X9-2GHN]. The State of Hawaii, for example, 
requires property owners who choose to contest forfeiture by filing a claim with the presiding circuit 
court to pay “a cost bond in the amount of $2500 or 10% of the estimated value of the property, 
whichever is greater.” Id.  
112. See, e.g., id. (explaining that unsuccessful claimants must “pay the State’s costs and expenses, 
including reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection with the judicial proceeding”). 
113. See Michael Sean Devereux, Civil Asset Forfeiture, AVVO (Apr. 16, 2021), 
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Additionally, law enforcement officers can persuade property owners 
to “consensually forfeit” their property and release all ownership interest 
to the agency.114 Often referred to as “roadside waivers”115 due to their 
frequent use during traffic stops, these forms may state something to the 
effect of “I, _______, . . . the owner of the property or currency described 
below, desire to give this property or currency, along with any and all 
interests and ownership that I may have in it, to the [government 
agency].”116 By signing the waiver, the owner releases their property to 
police and limits their ability to contest forfeiture in the future.117 Owners 
may be asked to sign these waivers without an opportunity to confer with 
an attorney or consider the long-term consequences of their actions.118 
Critics have accused police of using high pressure, coercive tactics to 
bully motorists into signing these waivers by threatening worse 
repercussions if they do not.119 Fearful of potential abuse, Texas,120 
Virginia,121 and Wyoming122 enacted policies expressly banning the use 
 
https://www.avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/PR4A-YNB4]. 
Ultimately, it is up to the adjudicator overseeing the forfeiture proceeding whether a prevailing 
property owner gets their bond money returned. See id. 
114. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 44.  
115. Id. 
116. The quoted language is adapted from a waiver form used by the Wyoming Highway Patrol. 
German Lopez, “It’s Been Complete Hell”: How Police Used a Traffic Stop to Take $91,800 from an 
Innocent Man, VOX (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/12/1/16686014/phillip-parhamovich-civil-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/XXL5-MGD3].  
117.  See George Leef, Another Ugly Civil Asset Forfeiture Tactic—Highway Stop ‘Waivers’, 




119. See, e.g., id.; Stillman, supra note 26 (describing instances in which police threaten serious 
criminal charges or removal of children from parents’ custody unless they agree to sign a waiver 
relinquishing their property to police).  
120. Edgar Walters & Jolie McCullough, Texas Police Made More than $50 Million in 2017 from 
Seizing People’s Property. Not Everyone Was Guilty of a Crime., TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2018, 12:00 
AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/12/07/texas-civil-asset-forfeiture-legislature/ [https://perm 
a.cc/T4D6-2BX8] (“Gov. Rick Perry in 2011 signed legislation prohibiting the use of such waivers, 
forcing all forfeitures to go through court.”). 
121. In 2015, the Virginia State Crime Commission recommended prohibiting waivers, reporting 
that “[h]aving law enforcement directly ‘negotiate’ with a property owner, without the direct 
involvement of a prosecutor and/or an attorney for the owner, can raise the appearance of unfair 
dealing or coercion. In other states where this practice became widespread, there have been reports 
that the process was abused.” VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, ASSET FORFEITURE (SB 684/HB 1287) 102 
(2015), http://vscc.virginia.gov/Asset%20Forfeiture_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BL6-CTN7]. 
The following year, the Governor of Virginia reformed state law to prohibit roadside waivers. See 
2016 Va. Acts ch. 203, § 19.2-386.2 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-203). 
122. German Lopez, Citing Vox Story, Wyoming Bans Practice that Police Used to Take Innocent 
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of roadside waivers to forfeit property. 
Because the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution123 
does not provide the right to an attorney in civil actions, property owners 
often attempt to represent themselves in forfeiture challenges.124 
However, federal jurisdictions do appoint counsel for low-income 
property owners who cannot afford to hire an attorney—but only when 
the civil forfeiture is connected to a charged criminal offense125 or when 
the property owner is facing the loss of their primary residence.126 Some 
jurisdictions also allow property owners who hire private counsel to 
recover reasonable attorneys’ fees from the government if they are 
successful in challenging the forfeiture.127 
If a property owner brings their case before an adjudicator, the burden 
of proof standards vary widely across jurisdictions. Twenty states 
(including Washington)128 and the federal government129 apply the 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in forfeiture 
proceedings.130 The burden of meeting this standard may be on the 
government, meaning the government must produce enough proof to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence the property is subject to 
forfeiture.131 However, in some jurisdictions the burden may be on the 
property owner to produce enough proof to show by a preponderance of 
 
Man’s $91,800, VOX (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/3/20/17142526/wyoming-waiver-forfeiture-phil-parhamovich [https://perma.cc/F7AC-
97LJ] (“The new law . . . bans officers from getting people to sign waivers that give up their rights to 
property, including cash, without a hearing and without establishing probable cause. Any waivers in 
violation of the law are declared ‘null and void.’”). 
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
124. See, e.g., United States v. 777 Greene Ave., 609 F.3d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[C]laimants in 
civil forfeiture proceedings lack a Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . .”); see also State ex rel. 
Eikenberry v. Frodert, 84 Wash. App. 20, 32, 924 P.2d 933, 940 (1996) (quoting State v. Long, 104 
Wash. 2d 285, 292, 705 P.2d 245, 249 (1985)) (“[T]here is no federal or state constitutional 
requirement that an indigent defendant receive the assistance of appointed counsel where there is no 
possibility of incarceration.”).  
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A). The statute allows the defendant’s appointed counsel in their 
criminal proceedings to also represent them in their forfeiture proceedings. Id. 
126. See id. § 983(b)(2)(A). 
127. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(6) (2020) (“In any proceeding to forfeit property 
under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonable 
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred by the claimant.”). Importantly, none of Washington’s other civil 
forfeiture statutes contain this provision.  
128. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 39. 
129. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c). 
130. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
131. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (“In all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law 
enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to 
forfeiture.”). 
Chigbrow (Do Not Delete) 10/19/21  1:46 PM 
1162 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1147 
 
the evidence their property is not subject to forfeiture.132 Regardless of 
which party bears the burden of proof, the preponderance standard 
requires a relatively low evidentiary showing. 
Not all legislation simplifies the forfeiture process for law enforcement. 
Ten states and the District of Columbia utilize some form of a clear and 
convincing standard of proof.133 This is an intermediate requirement 
between the preponderance standard and beyond a reasonable doubt.134 
Sixteen states require a criminal conviction, where the government must 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt135 before property can be forfeited 
in civil proceedings.136 Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico, and North 
Carolina have abolished civil forfeiture entirely and require agencies 
seeking forfeiture to proceed through the criminal system.137 The criminal 
process places more demanding requirements on the government and is 
more protective of individual rights. These heightened evidentiary 
requirements prevent due process violations against property owners and 
reduce forfeiture abuse by making it more challenging for law 
enforcement to successfully forfeit property.138 
2. The Equitable Sharing Program 
The recent increase in progressive forfeiture reforms at the state level 
may be frustrated by legislative loopholes that permit seizing agencies to 
circumvent their state’s stricter forfeiture laws. This is because a 
significant number of civil forfeitures are processed through what is 
known as the federal government’s “Equitable Sharing Program” 
 
132. See, e.g., 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-5.04.2(p) (2021) (“In any action brought under this 
section, the state shall have the initial burden of showing the existence of probable cause for seizure 
or arrest of the property. Upon that showing by the state, the claimant shall have the burden of showing 
by a preponderance of evidence that the property was not subject to forfeiture under this section.”). 
133. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 39. 
134. Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Evidence 
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden 
than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials.”).  
135. Reasonable Doubt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“‘Beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ is the standard used by a jury to determine whether a criminal defendant is guilty.”). 
136. See Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/activism/legisl 
ation/civil-forfeiture-legislative-highlights/#:~:text=Today%2C%20three%20states%E2%80%94No 
rth%20Carolina,criminal%20law%20to%20forfeit%20property [https://perma.cc/5FVW-KZK2].  
137. See id.; Nick Sibilla, Maine Abolishes Civil Forfeiture, Now Requires a Criminal Conviction 
to Take Property, FORBES (July 14, 2021, 2:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2021/ 
07/14/maine-abolishes-civil-forfeiture-now-requires-a-criminal-conviction-to-take-
property/?sh=4eeb65af5cf9 [https://perma.cc/ZWC7-SC44].  
138. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 39–40. 
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(ESP).139 Created by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,140 
the ESP is driven by the familiar “criminals should not profit off their 
wrongdoing” rationale. The ESP website states that forfeiture “remove[s] 
the tools of crime from criminal organizations, deprive[s] wrongdoers of 
the proceeds of their crimes, recover[s] property that may be used to 
compensate victims, and deter[s] crime.”141 The program shares federal 
forfeiture proceeds with state agencies in two ways: (1) when the state 
agency works with a federal agency in a joint investigation that results in 
federal forfeiture of property;142 and (2) when a federal agency “adopts” 
a state agency’s seizure for federal forfeiture (as long as the underlying 
criminal activity that justifies the forfeiture is illegal under federal law).143 
The state agency transfers seized property to the federal agency and the 
federal agency initiates forfeiture proceedings using federal law 
requirements.144 The state agency receives 80% of the funds generated 
from the adopted federal forfeiture.145 
Proponents of the ESP argue it enhances cooperation and coordination 
between different jurisdictions and allows for more efficient forfeiture 
processing, but critics argue the ESP is used as a loophole to allow state 
agencies to bypass their state laws.146 This is because once a state agency 
transfers seized property to a federal agency, the federal preponderance of 
the evidence standard applies regardless of the burden of proof under state 
law.147 The ESP also allows state agencies to evade their state’s statutory 
 
139. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 
929–30 (2015) (“Local departments have sought adoption and received money under the Equitable 
Sharing Program even when state laws would not have permitted forfeiture under the circumstances 
or would not have given funds to the police department if the state forfeited the property. Many 
thousands of law enforcement agencies have participated in the Equitable Sharing Program, and more 
than $4.5 billion has been shared.”). 
140. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2055 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1616a). 
141. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR 
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/cri
minal-afmls/file/794696/download [https://perma.cc/L8M6-RZV7]. 
142. Press Release, Drug Enforcement Administration, Equitable Sharing Program “Takes the 
Profit Out of Crime and Benefits Public Safety” (May 19, 2017), https://www.dea.gov/press-
releases/2017/05/19/equitable-sharing-program-takes-profit-out-crime-and-benefits-public 
[https://perma.cc/UDJ5-XGVZ]. The amount of proceeds shared with the state or local agency varies 
depending on their amount of effort and participation in the case. Id.  
143. See Jefferson E. Holcomb, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Marian R. Williams, Civil Asset 
Forfeiture, Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 273, 274 
(2011). 
144. See Stuteville, supra note 78, at 1185. 
145. Holcomb et al., supra note 143, at 274. 
146. Id.  
147. Id. at 274–75. 
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limitations on how forfeiture funds can be used and distributed.148 Over 
the last five fiscal years alone, the ESP paid out over $1.5 billion to state 
and local agencies across the country.149 The ESP provides large amounts 
of revenue to state agencies despite minimal requirements or oversight.150 
II. MODERN CRITICISMS OF CIVIL FORFEITURE 
Civil forfeiture creates two serious legal issues: (1) agencies can 
permanently take and keep property from innocent people while providing 
minimal legal protections;151 and (2) agencies are incentivized to forfeit 
property to fund their own budgets.152 These issues have led to widespread 
doubt regarding the constitutionality of civil forfeiture laws.153 
A 2016 poll found that 84% of Americans oppose civil asset 
forfeiture.154 Issues related to law enforcement rarely garner such 
bipartisan support, yet Republicans and Democrats appear to have found 
common ground in their opposition to civil forfeiture.155 Some critics label 
the current sentiment as “[t]he national revulsion against abusive civil 
asset forfeiture.”156 This opposition is exemplified in strong statements 
such as “[w]hen criminals take property, the law calls it theft. When law 
enforcement confiscates property, the process is called civil asset 
forfeiture.”157 
 
148. Id. at 275. 
149. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GRAND TOTAL OF EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS (FISCAL YEARS 
2016–2020), https://www.justice.gov/afp/reports-0 [https://perma.cc/H5K2-5SSR] (follow the 
hyperlinks for each fiscal year under the “Reports to Congress” subheading; then select the report 
labeled “Grand Total of Equitable Sharing Payments”). In 2020, Washington state and local agencies 
received nearly $7.6 million in forfeiture proceeds through the ESP. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EQUITABLE 
SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH AND SALE PROCEEDS BY RECIPIENT AGENCY FOR WASHINGTON 
(FISCAL YEAR 2020), https://www.justice.gov/afms/page/file/1361911/download 
[https://perma.cc/M65B-K9SK] [hereinafter EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH 2020].  
150. See Harmon, supra note 139, at 948–49. 
151. See Nelson, supra note 44, at 2517. 
152. KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 7. 
153. See, e.g., Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture 
as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2393–96 (2018) (describing a 
variety of due process concerns surrounding forfeiture). 
154. Emily Ekins, 84% of Americans Oppose Civil Asset Forfeiture, CATO INST. (Dec. 13, 2016, 
1:33 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/84-americans-oppose-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/F 
R9C-6KVM].  
155. Id. 
156. Leef, supra note 117. 
157. Crepelle, supra note 15, at 315. 
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A. Lack of Constitutional Safeguards 
In many jurisdictions, forfeiture laws provide nominal legal protections 
for property owners.158 Some commentators label civil forfeiture “an 
anomaly” because “it is an exclusively civil remedy based upon criminal 
facts.”159 Because of this unusual legal classification, many constitutional 
protections that would otherwise be provided in a criminal proceeding are 
absent in a forfeiture proceeding: the right to an attorney,160 heightened 
proof requirements,161 and protection from double jeopardy.162 Judges 
justify the lack of protections by pointing to the “civil” nature of 
forfeitures. Because forfeitures are handled through in rem proceedings 
against the property itself, property owners are not afforded many of the 
due process rights held by a defendant in a criminal case.163 Critics argue 
the lack of protections for property owners violates due process and stacks 
the deck in favor of the seizing agency.164 
Complicating the issue further is the fact that a forfeiture challenge can 
take years before the matter is resolved—and law enforcement may keep 
the seized property for the duration of the case.165 In Serrano v. Customs 
& Border Patrol,166 a vehicle owner waited over two years for a forfeiture 
hearing before his vehicle was returned.167 In 2015, federal agents at the 
United States-Mexico border seized Mr. Serrano’s 2014 Ford F-250 
pickup truck after finding five low-caliber bullets and a handgun 
magazine inside.168 The federal government claimed the items were 
evidence of an attempt to export “munitions of war” and retained 
 
158. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9. 
159. Nevin, supra note 61, at 307; see also Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wash. 2d 376, 378, 721 P.2d 519, 
520 (1986) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to an automobile forfeiture 
proceeding because it is “quasi-criminal in nature”). 
160. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9. 
161. See Note, supra note 153, at 2389 (comparing the requirements for criminal, civil, and 
administrative forfeitures). 
162. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270–71 (1996) (holding that civil forfeitures 
do not constitute punishment so as to trigger double jeopardy concerns). 
163. See Ross, supra note 62, at 263. 
164. See, e.g., David Pimentel, Forfeiture Policy in the United States: Is There Hope for Reform?, 
17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130 (2018) (citation omitted) (“The ease with which property 
can be seized, and the procedural presumptions in its favor, make it easy for law enforcement to take 
property, even if the legal claim to it is tenuous.”).  
165. See Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and Seize, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2014, at A1. 
166. 975 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 209 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2021). 
167. See id. at 492, 494. 
168. Id. at 492–93. 
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possession of the truck pending forfeiture proceedings.169 Despite Mr. 
Serrano’s repeated status inquiries and requests for information, “[f]or 23 
months, [the government] failed to institute forfeiture proceedings and 
Serrano was deprived of his property without a hearing to challenge the 
seizure or the continued retention of his vehicle.”170 The government did 
not return his truck until Mr. Serrano filed a civil lawsuit against Customs 
and Border Patrol in 2017.171 The civil suit made it before the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, where the court held due process does not require 
prompt post-seizure hearings.172 Particularly after a year filled with 
COVID-19 related court closures, Serrano raises an important issue 
regarding the duration agencies can retain seized property pending 
forfeiture proceedings. Courts across the country are experiencing a 
backlog of cases that will likely result in increased delays in civil 
forfeiture proceedings while property is held captive in legal limbo.173 
The United States Supreme Court recently offered some constitutional 
protection against a different aspect of forfeiture abuse. In Timbs v. 
Indiana,174 the Court held state civil forfeitures must not violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on excessive fines.175 The case originated after police 
seized a $42,000 Land Rover in connection with a criminal charge for 
dealing a controlled substance.176 Although the vehicle’s owner, Timbs, 
proved that the car was bought with funds from an insurance payout—a 
fully legal purchase unconnected to narcotic sales—the police seized it 
anyway because Timbs used the car to transport the drugs he sold.177 This 
occurred despite the fact the maximum fine for Timbs’s criminal charge 
was $10,000.178 A unanimous Court incorporated the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and held a civil forfeiture cannot be 
grossly disproportionate to the underlying criminal offense.179 However, 
 
169. Id. at 493–94. 
170. Id. at 494. 
171. Id.  
172. See id. at 500. In April 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States denied Mr. Serrano’s 
petition for review. See Serrano v. Customs & Border Prot., __ U.S. __, 209 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2021).  
173. See Jenni Bergal, Some States Halt Jury Trials Again, Leaving Staggering Backlogs and ‘a 
Lot of People Sitting in Jail’, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2020, 1:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/stor 
y/news/nation/2020/12/08/jury-trials-stopped-some-states-backlogs-build-amid-covid-19/6491162 
002 [https://perma.cc/7QXX-KLMN]. 
174. 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
175. See id. at 690. 
176. Id. at 686. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 687, 690. 
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the Court failed to provide clear guidance on what constitutes an excessive 
forfeiture.180 The Court also did not address any of the other constitutional 
safeguards missing in forfeiture proceedings. 
B. Profit Motive 
Civil forfeiture is a highly lucrative enterprise that has brought in multi-
billion-dollar revenues over the last two decades to law enforcement 
agencies across the country, and this creates concern regarding the 
possibility of profit motives.181 Many jurisdictions allow agencies to 
retain “most or all” of the proceeds derived from forfeitures.182 These 
proceeds fund a variety of departmental needs, including training, 
operations, bonuses, and equipment.183 However, agencies have also 
applied proceeds to purchase an office margarita machine184 and a $600 
coffee maker.185 The profit potential provides a financial incentive for law 
enforcement agencies to forfeit property to benefit their department’s 
bottom line.186 The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged 
the potential for abuse when forfeiture law provides financial impetus to 
forfeit by noting that “it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action 
more closely when the State stands to benefit.”187 
The concerns regarding a profit motive in civil asset forfeiture are not 
illusory. An Illinois deputy affiliated with highway interdiction training 
programs recently published a book advocating to “turn[] our police 
forces into present-day Robin Hoods” by taking valuable property from 
 
180. The Supreme Court found a forfeiture constitutionally excessive just once, in United States v. 
Bajakajian, when the federal government attempted to forfeit $357,144 in cash after the defendant 
failed to declare it in violation of customs laws. See 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).  
181. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 5. 
182. See id. at 34. In Washington, the seizing agency can keep 90% of forfeiture proceeds to fund 
their drug interdiction efforts. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(9)(a), (10) (2020). State records show 
civil forfeiture brought in an annual statewide average of over $9.2 million in 2016, 2017, and 2018. 
See Policing for Profit: Washington, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-
3/?state=WA [https://perma.cc/BB6R-8J94] [hereinafter IJ WA]. 
183. See Freivogel, supra note 26; Stillman, supra note 26. 
184. John Clarke, Washington, D.C., Approves Landmark Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, REUTERS 
(Nov. 18, 2014, 2:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-districtofcolumbia-forfeiture/was 
hington-d-c-approves-landmark-civil-asset-forfeiture-law-idUSKCN0J22J920141118 
[https://perma.cc/BG4N-8GZ4].  
185. Erin Fuchs, Here Are the Ridiculous Things Cops Bought with Cash ‘Seized’ from Americans, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2014, 12:53 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-what-police-
bought-with-civil-forfeiture-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/Y9UF-6MA7].  
186. See Ross, supra note 62, at 272–73. 
187. See Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991)). 
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owners to fund police budgets.188 This emphasis on forfeiture has 
impacted how departments plan their operations.189 For example, studies 
show that Texas law enforcement agencies concentrate traffic stops along 
the southbound interstate rather than the northbound.190 These agencies 
are operating under the assumption that cars traveling south towards the 
United States-Mexico border are more likely to contain large amounts of 
cash, while cars driving north are more likely to be carrying drugs.191 
Similar tactics were found in studies of law enforcement agencies in 
Missouri and Tennessee.192 Seizing and forfeiting cash is more beneficial 
to law enforcement because unlike drugs—which must be destroyed—
cash seizures can be forfeited to increase department revenue.193 One 
former DEA agent referred to large cash seizures as “the gift that keeps 
on giving.”194 This belief pervades cash-strapped agencies across the 
country who see civil forfeiture as a quick and easy way to maintain cash 
flow.195 
With the recent calls for defunding police,196 law enforcement agencies 
will be under increased pressure to boost funds through alternative sources 
like civil forfeiture.197 Nearly 300 police departments across the country 
seize property worth 20% or more of their annual budgets.198 Studies show 
that “a substantial proportion of law enforcement agencies reported that 
 
188. Sallah et al., supra note 165.  
189. See, e.g., Freivogel, supra note 26 (describing law enforcement methods focusing on 
forfeiture). 
190. See Jolie McCullough, Acacia Coronado & Chris Essig, Texas Police Can Seize Money and 
Property with Little Transparency. So We Got the Data Ourselves., TEX. TRIB. (June 7, 2019), 
https://apps.texastribune.org/features/2019/texas-civil-asset-forfeiture-counties-harris-webb-reeves-
smith/ [https://perma.cc/TWR7-TSGZ].  
191. See id. (“Webb County agencies made two seizures . . . from northbound stops after finding 
drugs in both vehicles, compared with 16 cash seizures from southbound lanes.”); Harmon, supra 
note 139, at 932–33. 
192. See Freivogel, supra note 26 (“Police in Missouri, Tennessee and other states focus their 
interdiction on the westbound lanes of interstates where cash from drug sales is returning to the cartels. 
Far fewer stops occur on the eastbound lanes where the drugs could be seized before they are sold to 
users.”). 
193. See Harmon, supra note 139, at 932–33. 
194. Sallah et al., supra note 165. 
195. See Holcomb et al., supra note 143, at 275. 
196. See Andy Rose & Hollie Silverman, Seattle’s Mayor Is Set to Sign a New City Budget Cutting 
the Police Department’s Funding by 18%, CNN (Nov. 25, 2020, 4:03 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/25/us/seattle-police-budget-cut/index.html [https://perma.cc/728J-
6HE9]. 
197. See David Crockett & Jennifer Earl, Defunding the Police Could Increase Policing if Cuts Are 
Too Modest, NEWSWEEK (July 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/defunding-police-
could-increase-policing-if-cuts-are-too-modest-opinion-1514519 [https://perma.cc/A8PR-6GVR]. 
198. Sallah et al., supra note 165. 
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they are coming to depend on civil forfeiture” to supplement their budgets, 
which may increase the potential for abuse.199 
C. Due Process Concerns 
As a civil proceeding, forfeiture has minor due process protections in 
place despite the major implications it has on an owner’s property 
rights.200 This is compounded by the fact that victims of forfeiture tend to 
identify with Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) 
communities and low-income communities.201 The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution unequivocally states that “[n]o person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” 
in the federal system.202 The Fourteenth Amendment places the same 
requirement on the states.203 Together, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee all citizens due process of law. 
There are two types of due process: procedural and substantive.204 
Courts explain that procedural due process “is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content.”205 Instead, it “is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”206 Substantive 
due process requirements ensure that government actions do not “‘shock[] 
the conscience’ or interfere[] with rights ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’”207 Due process concerns arise in the civil forfeiture 
context because forfeiture inherently involves deprivation of property. 
In 2017, Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States Supreme Court 
wrote an opinion openly questioning the constitutionality of modern civil 
forfeiture laws under the due process clause.208 The case arose after police 
officers in Texas stopped James Leonard for a traffic violation.209 The stop 
led to a vehicle search and police eventually discovered $201,100 and a 
 
199. Worrall, supra note 42, at 179 (emphasis in original).  
200. See Ross, supra note 62, at 263. 
201. See Christine A. Budasoff, Modern Civil Forfeiture Is Unconstitutional, 23 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 467, 480 (2019). 
202. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
204. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (describing procedural and substantive 
due process). 
205. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
206. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).  
207. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citations omitted).  
208. See Leonard v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the 
denial of certiorari). 
209. Id. at 847. 
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bill of sale for a house in a safe inside the vehicle’s trunk.210 After 
conflicting explanations of the safe’s contents, James stated the safe 
belonged to his mother, Lisa Leonard.211 Finding the circumstances 
suspicious, police seized and forfeited the $201,100.212 The police 
believed the cash was “substantially connected to criminal activity, 
namely, narcotics sales,” despite Lisa’s insistence that the cash came from 
a home she had recently sold (hence the bill of sale).213 
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s decision not to accept the case 
for review, but opined that modern civil forfeiture had outgrown its 
historical maritime roots and likely extended beyond what the United 
States Constitution would permit under the Due Process Clause.214 He 
pointed out civil forfeiture is penal in nature yet does not provide property 
owners the procedural and constitutional safeguards owed to criminal 
defendants.215 He also highlighted the profit incentive in civil forfeiture 
laws and discussed some high-profile abuses of the civil forfeiture 
system.216 He paid particular attention to cases in which law enforcement 
targeted low-income and BIPOC communities.217 Justice Thomas closed 
by saying “[w]hether this Court’s treatment of the broad modern forfeiture 
practice can be justified by the narrow historical one is certainly worthy 
of consideration in greater detail.”218  
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Leonard has increased doubt surrounding 
the constitutionality of civil forfeiture in the modern era.219 Federal 
District Court Judge Brian S. Miller “agree[s] with Justice Thomas’s 
position in Leonard that civil forfeiture has gotten out of hand and that it 
needs to be [reined] in so it is at least loosely tethered to its founding 
principles.”220 Justice Geoffrey G. Slaughter of the Indiana Supreme 
Court identified “serious concerns with the way Indiana carries out civil 
forfeitures” and commented that he is “await[ing] another case—brought 
 
210. Id.  
211. Id.; see also Jason Snead, Clarence Thomas Casts Doubt on the Constitutionality of Civil 
Forfeiture, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/claren 
ce-thomas-casts-doubt-the-constitutionality-civil-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/YMQ3-KSCM] 
(discussing Leonard v. Texas in further detail). 
212. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 849. 
215. Id. at 847–48. 
216. Id. at 848. 
217. See id. 
218. Id. at 850. 
219. See Note, supra note 153, at 2388. 
220. United States v. $284,950 in U.S. Currency, No. 4:16-CV-00168 BSM, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 241486, at *10 (E.D. Ark. May 22, 2018).  
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by the State or by a private party with a concrete, particularized injury—
to address the important constitutional questions that this and other civil-
forfeiture cases implicate.”221 
Other critics highlight the disparate impacts civil forfeiture laws have 
on BIPOC communities.222 It is difficult to precisely pinpoint the impacts 
civil forfeiture has on these communities due to inconsistent reporting 
requirements;223 nevertheless, it is likely civil forfeiture significantly 
impacts BIPOC communities through its application in the highly 
racialized “War on Drugs.”224 For example, studies show Black drivers 
are nearly 20% more likely to be pulled over than White drivers and, once 
pulled over, Black drivers are searched one-half to two times more often 
than White drivers.225 Higher levels of police interaction with BIPOC 
communities increase the likelihood of property seizure because many 
forfeitures originate with minor traffic stops.226 
Frequent police interactions result in highly impactful forfeitures for 
BIPOC community members. BIPOC individuals are more likely to carry 
cash due to long-standing racism in the banking industry227 and 
employment positions that pay in cash.228 A 2019 report on forfeitures in 
South Carolina found that seven out of ten individuals who had property 
seized were Black, and 65% of all cash seizures were taken from Black 
males.229 The simple act of carrying what police consider to be a large 
amount of cash is deemed a red flag and may be suspicious enough to 
 
221. Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 612 (Ind. 2019) (Slaughter, J., concurring) (arguing the 
plaintiff lacked standing to bring their constitutional challenges to forfeiture).  
222. Rebecca Vallas, Tracey Ross, Todd A. Cox, Jamal Hagler & Billy Corriher, Forfeiting the 
American Dream, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 1, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/04/01/134495/forfeiting-the-
american-dream/ [https://perma.cc/8CZ4-UM6M]. 
223. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 95, at 79 (noting the lack of studies tracking racial statistics in 
civil forfeitures). 
224. See Stillman, supra note 26. 
225. Research Shows Black Drivers More Likely to Be Stopped by Police, N.Y.U. (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/news/2020/may/black-drivers-more-likely-to-be-
stopped-by-police.html [https://perma.cc/SH3V-AGUF].  
226. See, e.g., Sallah et al., supra note 165 (describing the “aggressive brand of policing that has 
spurred the seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from motorists and others not charged 
with crimes”). 
227. See Murphy, supra note 95, at 94 (“Large national banks have historically been reluctant to 
open branches in minority neighborhoods, and have been known to offer unsatisfactory loans to racial 
minorities.”). 
228. See Nathaniel Cary & Mike Ellis, 65% of Cash Seized by SC Police Comes from Black Men. 
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prompt seizure.230 Once their property is seized, BIPOC individuals are 
less likely than White individuals to have access to attorneys to 
successfully challenge forfeiture proceedings.231 Despite the dearth of 
standardized reporting across race and ethnicity statistics, it can be 
reasonably presumed that civil forfeiture has a disproportionate impact on 
BIPOC communities.232 This racial effect further damns civil forfeiture 
on due process grounds. 
III. CIVIL FORFEITURE: WASHINGTON VS. NEW MEXICO 
Unlike New Mexico, which utilizes a criminal forfeiture system,233 
Washington mainly utilizes a civil forfeiture system.234 Washington has 
several civil forfeiture statutes, but the law relied on most frequently is 
RCW 69.50.505.235 This statute grants forfeiture authority over money, 
vehicles, realty, and other property traceable to drug law violations.236 
Other Washington laws authorize civil forfeiture of property connected to 
illegal gambling,237 sexual exploitation of minors,238 fish and wildlife law 
violations,239 tax evasion,240 and unlicensed sale of tobacco products,241 
among others. This Comment focuses on RCW 69.50.505 because the 
Supreme Court of Washington decides all major civil forfeiture 
challenges under this statute.242 However, much of the procedural 
language and requirements apply equally to all civil forfeiture laws in 
 
230. See, e.g., Sallah et al., supra note 165 (“For many innocents caught in the seizure net, the 
biggest misstep was carrying more cash than police thought was normal for law-abiding citizens.”). 
231. See Murphy, supra note 95, at 96–97. 
232. Id. at 79 (using anecdotal evidence showing racial bias in forfeiture application to presume a 
general disparate impact on racial minorities).  
233. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-11 (LexisNexis 2021). 
234. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (2020) (Washington’s most cited forfeiture statute). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. § 69.50.505(1). 
237. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.231 (2020).  
238. Id. § 9.68A.120.  
239. WASH. REV. CODE § 77.15.070 (2020). 
240. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.32.670 (2020).  
241. Id. § 82.26.230.  
242. For a variety of precedential Washington State Supreme Court cases decided under WASH. 
REV. CODE § 69.50.505, see Tellevik v. 31641 W. Rutherford St., 125 Wash. 2d 364, 884 P.2d 1319 
(1994); State v. Clark, 124 Wash. 2d 90, 875 P.2d 613 (1994); State v. Cole, 128 Wash. 2d 262, 906 
P.2d 925 (1995); State v. Catlett, 133 Wash. 2d 355, 945 P.2d 700 (1997); Guillen v. Contreras, 169 
Wash. 2d 769, 238 P.3d 1168 (2010); Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf’t Team v. 115 Freeman Lane, 
191 Wash. 2d 654, 424 P.3d 1226 (2018) (all involving interpretations of WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 69.50.505). Researching Washington case law did not produce any precedent-setting cases under 
any civil forfeiture statute except WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505. 
Chigbrow (Do Not Delete) 10/19/21  1:46 PM 
2021] POLICE OR PIRATES? 1173 
 
Washington. 
Conversely, New Mexico abolished all civil forfeiture when it enacted 
the 2015 New Mexico Forfeiture Act.243 To nullify concerns over the lack 
of due process protections in civil forfeiture proceedings, this 
revolutionary legislation requires the government to process forfeitures 
through the criminal justice system.244 Thus, a property owner in New 
Mexico must be criminally convicted—with all the constitutional 
protections afforded to criminal defendants—before they can be 
permanently deprived of any property traceable to their crime.245 These 
new laws also close federal equitable sharing loopholes246 and eliminate 
any profit motive driving forfeiture by requiring forfeiting agencies to 
transfer forfeiture proceeds to the state’s general fund instead of retaining 
the funds in-house as revenue.247 Washington’s minimal legal protections 
for property owners navigating the civil forfeiture system and profit-
incentivizing provisions fall far short of New Mexico’s forward-looking 
Act. 
A. Civil Forfeiture in Washington 
Washington authorized forfeiture for property involved in drug crime 
violations in the 1970s.248 Over the last two decades, Washington 
generated nearly $145 million in forfeiture revenue under state law and an 
additional $87 million in forfeitures processed through the federal 
government’s ESP.249 This has caused some departments to rely on 
forfeiture funds to supplement their budget250 and created some concern 
among justices on the Supreme Court of Washington bench.251 
1. History of RCW 69.50.505 
Washington’s primary civil forfeiture statute, RCW 69.50.505, was 
enacted in 1971 as part of the state’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
 
243. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-11 (LexisNexis 2021).  
244. Id. § 31-27-4. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. § 31-27-11. 
247. Id. § 31-27-7(C). 
248. Uniform Controlled Substances Act, ch. 308, § 69.50.505, 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws 1794, 
1817–19. 
249. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 154. These figures include criminal and civil forfeiture 
totals. Id. 
250. CITY OF SEATTLE, WASH., Law Department, in 2019–2020 PROPOSED BUDGET 288 (2018), 
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FinanceDepartment/19proposedbudget/LAW.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TKF-D93Q]. 
251. See City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d 600, 617, 398 P.3d 1078, 1085 (2017). 
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(UCSA).252 This statute is used as a deterrent in the War on Drugs and 
permits forfeiture of all property connected to or derived from a violation 
of the UCSA253—including vehicles, 254 cash,255 and homes.256 Originally, 
the only high-value personal property the law allowed agencies to forfeit 
were vehicles.257 However, the statute was amended in 1982 to include 
forfeiture of money258 and again in 1989 to reach real property.259 The 
1989 legislative findings state that forfeiting real property  
where a substantial nexus exists between the commercial 
production or sale of the substances and the real property will 
provide a significant deterrent to crime by removing the profit 
incentive of drug trafficking, and will provide a revenue source 
that will partially defray the large costs incurred by government 
as a result of these crimes.260 
To this day, crime deterrence and punishment remain the policy goals of 
Washington’s forfeiture laws.261 
Additionally, Washington law provides for an administrative forfeiture 
process.262 RCW 69.50.505 allows police to seize property once they have 
probable cause to believe the property is connected to illegal drug sales or 
manufacturing.263 Once an agency seizes property, it must serve a notice 
upon the property owner within fifteen days that informs them of their 
 
252. See § 69.50.505, 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1817–19.  
253. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d at 615–16, 398 P.3d at 1085 (“[The government] was 
required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the property owner’s] car and money 
were specifically connected to drug manufacturing, transactions, or distribution.”). 
254. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(1)(d) (2020).  
255. Id. § 69.50.505(1)(g). 
256. Id. § 69.50.505(1)(h).  
257. Id. § 69.50.505(a)(4), 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1817 (“The following are subject to 
forfeiture . . . all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or intended for 
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of 
[illegal controlled substances and/or related materials and equipment].”). 
258. Controlled Substances—Forfeiture, Seizure of Property—Imitation Controlled Substances, 
ch. 171, sec. 1, § 69.50.505(a)(7), 1982 Wash. Sess. Laws 684, 685. 
259. Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substances Act, ch. 271, sec. 212, § 69.50.505(a)(8), 1989 
Wash. Sess. Laws 1266, 1300.  
260. Id. at 1298–99. 
261. See, e.g., City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d 600, 608, 398 P.3d 1078, 1081 (2017) 
(identifying drug crime deterrence and punishment as the intended result of forfeiture).  
262. See supra section I.B.1. 
263. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(2)(d) (2020); see also Valerio v. Lacey Police Dep’t, 110 
Wash. App. 163, 176–77, 39 P.3d 332, 339 (2002) (quoting Barlindal v. City of Bonney Lake, 84 
Wash. App. 135, 141, 925 P.2d 1289, 1292 (1996) (“Under Washington forfeiture law, probable cause 
requires the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently 
strong to warrant a person of ordinary caution in the belief that the property was used or intended to 
be used in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA).”). 
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right to challenge the forfeiture.264 If the owner elects to challenge the 
forfeiture, the agency’s chief law enforcement officer or an appointed 
administrative law judge will hear the case.265 A representative from the 
seizing agency must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
property is subject to forfeiture.266 If forty-five days have lapsed since 
service and no one has claimed a possessory interest in the seized items, 
they are forfeited by default and officially become property of the seizing 
agency.267 The window of time before default on real property is extended 
to ninety days from the date the notice was served.268 The agency may 
sell, destroy, or retain the property for official use once forfeited.269 
2. Application of Civil Forfeiture Laws in Washington 
Washington law enforcement agencies are candid about their financial 
reliance on civil forfeiture. For example, in the 2019–2020 proposed 
budget for the City of Seattle Law Department, the agency requested to 
create a new staff position in their civil forfeiture unit.270 The budget 
proposal allocated nearly $59,000 for the half-time position and stated 
“[i]n 2018 the Seattle Police Department (SPD) increased efforts to seek 
forfeitures of real and personal property in civil forfeiture cases. This 
increase is expected to continue in 2019. . . . Forfeiture cases provide 
revenue to SPD and support for this position is available from these 
funds.”271 Moreover, in 2020, the Seattle Police Department received over 
$1.2 million in payments from the ESP.272 This figure does not include 
proceeds from the agency’s local, non-ESP forfeitures. 
Smaller Washington agencies also profit considerably from civil 
forfeiture. From 2012 to 2015, the Spokane Police Department in eastern 
Washington brought in an annual average of $170,000 from local 
forfeiture proceeds.273 One Spokane councilman stated “if someone was 
using a vehicle to sell drugs, you get the vehicle. If they were using the 
 
264. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(3).  
265. Id. § 69.50.505(5). 
266. Id. Property owners may also elect to remove the case to the local district court. See id.  
267. Id. § 69.50.505(4). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. § 69.50.505(7).  
270. CITY OF SEATTLE, WASH., supra note 250, at 288. 
271. Id. at 288, 289. 
272. EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH 2020, supra note 149 (totals for fiscal year 2020). 
273. Thomas Clouse, U.S. Supreme Court Ban on Excessive Forfeitures Likely Will Affect Spokane 
Police, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2019/feb/20/court-
constitutional-ban-on-high-fines-applies-to-/ [https://perma.cc/7RUC-Q83R].  
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house, you get the house.”274 In northern Washington, the Whatcom 
County Sheriff’s Office received $894,993 from the ESP in 2019—the 
highest of any agency in the state that year.275 This is a significant amount 
for a department with less than 200 people on staff.276 
While Washington law enforcement agencies bolster their budgets with 
forfeiture proceeds, property owners are left in the lurch. A 2001 study 
found that in King County, 20% of individuals who had property seized 
were never charged with a crime.277 Of those who did have formal charges 
brought against them, nearly 25% of the cases were eventually dropped.278 
In total, almost 40% of all asset seizures did not result in a conviction.279 
Nevertheless, most property owners do not get their items back from 
police.280 The preponderance of the evidence standard is extremely 
deferential to the agency and sets a low bar for justifying forfeiture.281 
Additionally, the process to reclaim property is long, confusing, and 
expensive.282 Challenging forfeiture often costs more in attorneys’ fees 
than what the property itself is worth.283 Low-income individuals facing 
forfeiture do not have the right to an attorney for assistance in these civil 
proceedings.284 For many, the legal battle is simply not feasible.285 
3. Interpretation of Civil Forfeiture Laws in Washington 
Despite the recent push for civil forfeiture reform in other jurisdictions, 
Washington courts have not significantly addressed the constitutionality 
of civil forfeiture in the twenty-first century. The judiciary has previously 
waffled on constitutional challenges to RCW 69.50.505. For example, in 
 
274. Id. 
275. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH AND SALE PROCEEDS BY 
RECIPIENT AGENCY FOR WASHINGTON: FISCAL YEAR 2019 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/afp/page/file/1250761/download [https://perma.cc/4HCN-4KEC]. 
276. See WHATCOM CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., WHATCOM COUNTY SHERRIFF’S OFFICE PATROL 
DEPUTY, https://www.whatcomcounty.us/DocumentCenter/View/32744/Patrol-Recruitment-Broch 
ure?bidId= [https://perma.cc/JSQ2-BX6F].  
277. Sam Skolnik, Critics Target Drug Raid Seizures, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 13, 
2001, at A1. 
278. Id.  
279. Id.  
280. Id. 
281. See supra section I.B.1. 
282. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 30. 
283. See id. at 6.  
284. See State ex rel. Eikenberry v. Frodert, 84 Wash. App. 20, 32, 924 P.2d 933, 940 (1996) 
(quoting State v. Long, 104 Wash. 2d 285, 292, 705 P.2d 245, 249 (1985)). 
285. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 6. 
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Deeter v. Smith286 the Supreme Court of Washington stated civil forfeiture 
proceedings are “quasi criminal in nature since their purpose is to penalize 
individuals who participate in the illegal transportation of controlled 
substances.”287 Because of this quasi-criminal label, the Deeter Court 
unanimously held the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to 
exclude illegally seized evidence from admission in a forfeiture 
proceeding.288 Conversely, in State v. Catlett289 the Court held that 
“RCW 69.50.505 is not so punitive as to constitute criminal punishment 
for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.”290 
In yet another swing of the pendulum, the Washington Court of 
Appeals held forfeiture of real property under the “knowledge provision” 
of RCW 69.50.505(1)(h) is considered a “punishment” under the Eighth 
Amendment.291 This means Washington courts must assess the 
proportionality between the alleged criminal activity and the value of the 
seized property for excessiveness, among other factors.292 The Supreme 
Court of Washington also held a seizure pursuant to civil forfeiture does 
not violate procedural due process requirements despite the fact that 
seizure occurs without notice or a prior opportunity to be heard.293 The 
Court reasoned that a balancing test tilted in favor of the significant 
governmental interests at stake.294 These decisions have sat undisturbed 
for over two decades now. 
Although the Supreme Court of Washington has not directly addressed 
the constitutionality of civil forfeiture in recent years, the 2017 case of 
City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez295 provides some hope to those seeking 
forfeiture reform.296 In a unanimous opinion, the Court cabined civil 
forfeiture by specifying RCW 69.50.505 is meant to address drug 
manufacturing, sales, and distribution—not minor-level drug 
 
286. 106 Wash. 2d 376, 721 P.2d 519 (1986). 
287. Id. at 378, 721 P.2d at 520–21. 
288. Id. 
289. 133 Wash. 2d 355, 945 P.2d 700 (1997). 
290. Id. at 368–69, 945 P.2d at 706. 
291. See Tellevik v. 6717 100th St. S.W., 83 Wash. App. 366, 375–76, 921 P.2d 1088, 1093–94 
(1996); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
292. See 6717 100th St. S.W., 83 Wash. App. at 375–76, 921 P.2d at 1093–94.  
293. See Tellevik v. 31641 W. Rutherford St., 120 Wash. 2d 68, 87, 838 P.2d 111, 121 (1992). 
294. See id. 
295. 188 Wash. 2d 600, 398 P.3d 1078 (2017). 
296. See Ronald Farley, Not So Fast! Washington’s Supreme Court Takes a Critical Look at Civil 
Forfeiture Under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 71 NWLAWYER 14 (2017).  
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possession.297 Mr. Gonzales was initially pulled over for speeding.298 
However, the police seized his vehicle and $5,940 in cash after they found 
a “user amount” of cocaine.299 Based on the cash, the drugs, and the fact 
that Mr. Gonzalez’s car was registered to an out-of-state owner, police 
believed they had enough evidence to forfeit the cash and vehicle as 
property connected to a drug transaction.300 The Court disagreed and 
found “no evidence” the cash or the vehicle were connected to drug 
production or sales.301 The Court repudiated forfeiture based on 
possession of small amounts of controlled substances.302 The Court added 
that robust appellate review “is particularly important in the forfeiture 
context because an individual may lose valuable property even where no 
drug crime has actually been committed.”303 The Court acknowledged the 
profit motive in forfeiture and stated “the government has a strong 
financial incentive to seek forfeiture because the seizing law enforcement 
agency is entitled to keep or sell most forfeited property.”304 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington handed down a 
decision in State v. Blake305 that could have significant implications for 
RCW 69.50.505’s constitutionality. The issue before the Court in Blake 
was whether Washington’s simple drug possession statute violated due 
process because of its associated “substantial penalties for . . . innocent, 
passive conduct.”306 The defendant in the case, Blake, had a small quantity 
of methamphetamine in the coin pocket of her jeans.307 Blake and other 
witnesses testified the jeans were given to her by a friend and she denied 
any knowledge of the drugs.308 The trial court held Blake “had not met her 
burden to prove that her possession was unwitting” and found her guilty 
of felony drug possession.309 However, the Supreme Court of Washington 
vacated Blake’s conviction and held the trial court errored because 
penalizing “innocent nonconduct” by someone who lacks any guilty intent 
 
297. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d at 608, 398 P.3d at 1081. 
298. Id. at 603, 398 P.3d at 1079. 
299. Id. at 603–04, 398 P.3d at 1079. 
300. Id. at 604, 398 P.3d at 1079. 
301. Id. at 609, 398 P.3d at 1082. 
302. Id. at 616, 398 P.3d at 1085. 
303. Id. at 617, 398 P.3d at 1085. 
304. Id. 
305. 197 Wash. 2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).  
306. Id. at 173, 481 P.3d at 524.  
307. Id. at 174, 481 P.3d at 524. 
308. Id. at 175, 481 P.3d at 524. 
309. Id. 
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violates due process of law.310 Forfeiture could be analogized as similarly 
punishing “innocent nonconduct” because the Court has already 
acknowledged that property owners may face forfeiture despite never 
committing a crime. 
In its opinion in Blake, the Court underscored the disproportionate 
impact Washington’s drug laws (including RCW 69.50.505) have on 
young men of color. The Court cited a 2012 report which “attribute[ed] 
Washington’s racially disproportionate criminal justice system to 
disparity in drug law enforcement and drug-related asset forfeiture, among 
many other causes.”311 The report unequivocally found “Washington’s 
drug-related asset forfeiture laws reinforce drug-related law enforcement 
tactics that have a disparate impact on racial minorities.”312 Moreover, the 
report calls attention to the conflict created by the profit motive inherent 
in Washington’s forfeiture laws and how it affects the way agencies make 
operational decisions.313 The report also criticizes the preponderance of 
the evidence standard of proof by describing it as “one of the lowest in the 
country, and . . . highly deferential to law enforcement.”314 This 
recognition of the potential for abuse is a promising step toward following 
New Mexico’s lead and abolishing Washington’s civil forfeiture system. 
B. Abolishment of Civil Forfeiture in New Mexico 
Over the last twenty years, the New Mexico legislature enacted major 
changes to its forfeiture laws to better protect property owners and prevent 
abuse of the forfeiture system.315 These changes culminated in the passage 
of the Forfeiture Act316 in 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2015 Act”), 
in which the legislature fully abolished civil forfeiture and replaced it with 
a strict criminal forfeiture system that requires a conviction prior to 
forfeiture.317 Although opponents of the 2015 Act predicted a major 
increase in crime following implementation, recent studies show this has 
 
310. Id. at 188, 481 P.3d at 531. 
311. Id. at 192, 481 P.3d at 533. 
312. Rsch. Working Grp., Task Force on Race and the Crim. Just. Sys., Preliminary Report on 
Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 655 (2012). 
313. Id. at 653–54. 
314. Id. at 654. 
315. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-8 (LexisNexis 2002) (including very few 
legal protections for property owners facing forfeiture), with N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to -11 
(LexisNexis 2021) (including some of the strongest forfeiture-related legal protections for property 
owners in the country). 
316. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to -11 (LexisNexis 2021).  
317. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2015). 
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not come to pass.318 New Mexico’s current forfeiture laws provide the 
strongest protections for property owners in the country and serve as a 
model for fellow states with an eye for reform.319 
1. History of Forfeiture Reform in New Mexico 
At the close of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico took a close look at the state’s forfeiture laws to address due 
process concerns surrounding the burden of proof in forfeiture 
proceedings.320 In State v. Nunez,321 the Court held that “[t]he fact that the 
State bears a low burden of proof—be it either probable cause or 
preponderance of the evidence—when it initiates the deprivation of a 
fundamental constitutional right raises grave due process concerns.”322 At 
that time, New Mexico’s forfeiture statute was ambiguous as to whether 
the government or the property owner bore the burden of proof in 
forfeiture proceedings.323 The Court examined different interpretive 
arguments and found the law could have been plausibly interpreted to only 
require the government to show probable cause that the property in 
question was connected to a crime.324 The property owner would then be 
forced to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their property was 
not subject to forfeiture.325 This interpretation, coupled with the lack of 
“protections that are indispensable in a criminal setting—such as proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, presumption of 
innocence, [and] the right to confront one’s accusers,”326 spurred the Court 
to shift the burden onto the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the seized property is subject to forfeiture.327 
After the Court’s ruling in Nunez at the end of 1999 and its codification 
in 2002,328 New Mexico’s forfeiture laws required forfeiture and criminal 
 
318. Nick Sibilla, When New Mexico Abolished Civil Forfeiture 5 Years Ago, Cops Predicted 
Crime Would Soar. It Didn’t, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nick
sibilla/2020/12/17/when-new-mexico-abolished-civil-forfeiture-5-years-ago-cops-predicted-crime-
would-soar-it-didnt/?sh=5c88f0512729 [https://perma.cc/BL35-PB9J]. 
319. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 122–23.  
320. See State v. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶ 108, 129 N.M. 63, 90, 2 P.3d 264, 291 (1999). 
321. 2000-NMSC-013, 129 N.M. 63, 2 P.3d 264 (1999). 
322. Id. at ¶ 108, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291. 
323. Id. at ¶ 107, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291. 
324. Id. 
325. Id.  
326. Id. at ¶ 109, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291.  
327. Id. at ¶ 110, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291. 
328. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to -8 (LexisNexis 2002).  
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charges to “be brought in a single, bifurcated proceeding,”329 allowed 
public defenders appointed in criminal proceedings to defend property 
owners in their forfeiture proceedings, set the burden of proof for the 
government at clear and convincing, and enabled safeguards to protect 
against excessive forfeitures in proportion to the alleged criminal 
offense.330 
Despite these turn-of-the-century enactments, the Institute for Justice 
rated New Mexico’s forfeiture laws just slightly higher than Washington’s 
current rating.331 In 2010, New Mexico scored a D+ on the Institute’s 
forfeiture law grading scale because the state still allowed law 
enforcement agencies to retain 100% of the proceeds derived from 
forfeiture and because they placed the burden on property owners to prove 
their “innocent owner” defense.332 Additionally, the New Mexico 
legislature did not do enough to curb participation in the federal ESP.333 
Between 2001 and 2002, when the stricter state laws were enacted, the 
funds paid to New Mexico by the federal government via the ESP nearly 
doubled.334 
The New Mexico legislature recognized the shortcomings in its early 
reform efforts and went even further to curb civil forfeiture abuse by 
abolishing its usage entirely in the 2015 Act.335 The new legislation 
“require[s] a criminal conviction to forfeit property, shift[s] the burden of 
proof from innocent owners onto the government, and set[s] up court 
hearings to better ensure due process.”336 The 2015 Act also mandates that 
forfeiture proceeds are deposited into the state’s general fund rather than 
remain with the seizing agency.337 The stated purposes of the 2015 Act 
 
329. Michelle R. Haubert-Barela, Note, Complying with Nunez: The Necessary Procedure for 
Obtaining Forfeiture of Property and Avoiding Double Jeopardy After State v. Esparza, 34 N.M. L. 
REV. 561, 567 (2004). 
330. Id. at 567–68. 
331. Compare IJ WA, supra note 182 (grading Washington’s 2020 forfeiture laws with a D-), with 
MARIAN R. WILLIAMS, JEFFERSON E. HOLCOMB, TOMISLAV V. KOVANDZIC & SCOTT BULLOCK, 
POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 78 (1st ed. 2010) (grading New 
Mexico’s 2010 forfeiture laws with a D+).  
332. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 331, at 78. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. (totaling New Mexico’s 2001 equitable sharing proceeds at $1,157,905 and 2002’s 
equitable sharing proceeds at $2,272,066).  
335. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2015); see also Nick Sibilla, Cops Can’t Ignore New 
Mexico’s Ban on Civil Forfeiture, Court Rules, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2018, 9:35 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2018/12/19/cops-cant-ignore-new-mexicos-ban-on-civil-
forfeiture-court-rules/?sh=48f4f0396a7d [https://perma.cc/4V5L-Q6BC] (describing New Mexico’s 
abolishment of civil forfeiture and switch to a criminal forfeiture system). 
336. Sibilla, supra note 335. 
337. Id. 
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are to: 
(1) make uniform the standards and procedures for the seizure and 
forfeiture of property subject to forfeiture; 
(2) protect the constitutional rights of persons whose property is 
subject to forfeiture and of innocent owners holding interests in 
property subject to forfeiture; 
(3) deter criminal activity by reducing its economic incentives; 
(4) increase the pecuniary loss from criminal activity; 
(5) protect against the wrongful forfeiture of property; and 
(6) ensure that only criminal forfeiture is allowed in this state and 
only pursuant to state law.338 
Under the new laws, a property owner must first be criminally 
convicted—beyond a reasonable doubt—of an “offense to which 
forfeiture applies.”339 The same judge and/or jury340 will decide the 
forfeiture matter in an ancillary proceeding if the defendant property 
owner’s criminal trial ends in a guilty verdict.341 The government then has 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the seized property was 
used to commit the criminal offense, was acquired by way of the offense, 
or is “directly traceable to property acquired through the commission of 
the offense.”342 Ultimately, the government must prove the following 
elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the property is subject to 
forfeiture; (2) the property owner was convicted of the underlying crime; 
and (3) the value of the property is not unreasonably disproportionate to 
the crime.343 
Once forfeited, the property is sold by the state treasurer at public 
auction.344 The proceeds are used to reimburse the forfeiting agency’s 
reasonable expenses incurred in the “storage, 
protection, . . . transfer, . . . [and] dispos[al] of the property” and the 
remaining balance is deposited into the state’s general fund.345 The 
drafters of the 2015 Act also made sure to prevent backdoor civil 
forfeiture via the ESP. Thus, agencies can only transfer property to the 
 
338. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-2(A) (LexisNexis 2021). 
339. Id. § 31-27-4(A). The 2015 Act also allows for forfeiture inclusion in plea agreements. See id. 
§ 31-27-4(C). 
340. Only forfeiture proceedings where the property is valued at $20,000 or more are eligible for a 
jury. See id. § 31-27-6(E). 
341. Id. § 31-27-6(C). 
342. Id. § 31-27-4(A) to (B).  
343. Id. § 31-27-6(G). 
344. Id. § 31-27-7(B). 
345. Id. 
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federal government for forfeiture under the ESP if the property is worth 
over $50,000 and the underlying crime was interstate and complex, or if 
“the seized property may only be forfeited under federal law.”346 The 2015 
Act expressly states “law enforcement agenc[ies] shall not transfer 
property to the federal government if the transfer would circumvent the 
protections of the Forfeiture Act.”347 These provisions taken together 
provide much-needed due process protections and make New Mexico the 
leading state in the nation on civil forfeiture reform.348 
2. Implications of the 2015 Act 
Despite critics’ predictions to the contrary, the 2015 Act’s legal 
advancements have not increased New Mexico’s crime rate.349 New 
Mexico’s Department of Public Safety argued losing the significant 
revenue stream from civil forfeiture would negatively affect law 
enforcement’s ability to investigate criminal activity.350 They anticipated 
the change would have “a direct impact on the public safety of NM 
citizens.”351 The Chairman of the New Mexico Sheriff’s Association 
warned that passage of the bill would mean New Mexico citizens would 
“get less law enforcement.”352 Multiple police agencies across the state 
sent letters to the governor requesting a veto of the legislation.353 Yet in a 
recent study comparing the crime rate in New Mexico to those of 
neighboring states, “no significant increase in crime rates” was found.354 
This research supports the conclusions that “the reforms had no negative 
effect on public safety” and “civil forfeiture is not an essential crime-
fighting tool.”355 
Although New Mexico’s forfeiture reform is a model for other states, 
it is not perfect. Some of the main areas for improvement are forfeiture 
 
346. Id. § 31-27-11(A). 
347. Id. § 31-27-11(B). 
348. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31. 
349. See Sibilla, supra note 318. 




352. Ryan Boetel & Dan Boyd, Bill Would Kill ‘Policing for Profit’, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 28, 
2015, 12:05 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/561411/bill-on-seizures-would-kill-policing-for-
profit.html [https://perma.cc/B9NY-PZWH].  
353. Id. 
354. KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 32. 
355. Id. 
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tracking and reporting.356 The 2015 Act has a clear mandate to annually 
report all seizures and forfeitures to the Department of Public Safety,357 
but many law enforcement agencies have refused to comply.358 Securing 
compliance has proven difficult because the 2015 Act did not include 
enforcement provisions.359 While these are valid concerns, they do not 
detract from the major due process milestones the New Mexico courts and 
legislature have achieved over the last two decades. 
IV. ABOLISHMENT OF WASHINGTON’S CIVIL FORFEITURE 
SYSTEM 
Civil forfeiture is an abusive practice that harms innocent property 
owners and incentivizes police departments to forfeit property for their 
own pecuniary gain. The forfeiture statutes in Washington are “civil” in 
name only. In reality, they are highly punitive criminal statutes yet they 
provide only a fraction of the due process protections normally guaranteed 
to criminal defendants.360 Therefore, Washington should abolish civil 
forfeiture entirely. The Washington legislature should follow New 
Mexico’s lead to create a criminal forfeiture system by expanding on 
Washington’s current criminal forfeiture statute. This new system must 
increase police accountability and eliminate any profit motive by 
requiring forfeiting agencies to deposit proceeds in the state’s general 
fund. Any ESP loopholes must be closed with explicit statutory language. 
Lastly, Washington legislators should improve upon the identified 
weaknesses in New Mexico’s criminal forfeiture laws by including strict 
enforcement provisions and reporting requirements. 
The first step toward abolishing Washington’s civil forfeiture system 
begins with acknowledging that RCW 69.50.505 violates due process and 
should be found unconstitutional. However, Washington statutes are 
afforded a presumption of constitutionality.361 This means that a person 
 
356. See id. at 12 (grading New Mexico’s tracking of seized property at a D-).  
357. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-9 (LexisNexis 2021). 
358. In 2020, not one single forfeiture was officially reported to the state. See N.M. DEP’T OF PUB. 
SAFETY, SEIZURES AND FORFEITURES DETAIL REPORT 1 (2020), https://www.dps.nm.gov/images/
NMForfeiture/2020-Forfeiture-Detail-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2W4-R3M4]. 
359. See, e.g., Phaedra Haywood, New Mexico Agencies Fail to Report Forfeited Assets as Law 
Requires, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (July 22, 2018), https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/lo
cal_news/new-mexico-agencies-fail-to-report-forfeited-assets-as-law-requires/article_cd7b5b77-
7a19-5941-9145-739ef9803f75.html [https://perma.cc/C9NV-YUXZ] (reporting on compliance 
issues among New Mexican jurisdictions); KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 14 (grading New 
Mexico’s penalties for reporting violations with an F). 
360. See supra Part II. 
361. See State v. Walter Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 27, 149 P. 330, 331 (1915).  
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who challenges a statute on constitutional grounds must “demonstrate its 
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.”362 RCW 69.50.505 does not set 
the government’s burden of proof at guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For this reason, it should be found constitutionally invalid. Rather than 
continuing to rely on the “‘legal fiction’ that ‘[i]t is the property which is 
proceeded against, and . . . held guilty and condemned as though it were 
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient,’”363 which “prevents courts 
from applying constitutional rules that ‘are expressly limited to criminal 
cases,’”364 Washington’s civil forfeiture laws should be found 
unconstitutional and reformed to eliminate any potential for profit motive 
and provide property owners the legal protections that due process 
requires. 
Over the years, Washington courts have repeatedly acknowledged that 
civil forfeiture is “quasi criminal,” but this equivocating label does not 
accurately portray its punitive effect. Both Washington state courts and 
federal courts have held that a legislative body’s decision on where to 
include a statute (whether in a civil or criminal section of legislation) is 
suggestive of the statute’s nature.365 RCW 69.50.505’s location in the 
UCSA is evidence of its criminal nature.366 Forfeiture is inherently 
connected to illegal activity and its placement among Washington’s drug 
laws is further proof of this.367 
RCW 69.50.505 is overwhelmingly punitive, both in purpose and in 
effect. Despite its “civil” label, this law functions as a criminal statute—
yet it is not accompanied by the procedural and constitutional protections 
afforded to criminal defendants.368 The Supreme Court of Washington has 
admitted “[t]he civil label is not always dispositive” and that “[w]here a 
 
362. Hontz v. State, 105 Wash. 2d 302, 306, 714 P.2d 1176, 1178–79 (1986) (emphasis added).  
363. Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf’t Team v. 115 Freeman Lane, 191 Wash. 2d 654, 666–67, 
424 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2018) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 
275 (1996)).  
364. Id. at 667, 424 P.3d at 1233 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 607 (1993)). 
365. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 19, 857 P.2d 989, 996 (1993) 
(attaching weight to the fact the state legislature placed a statute allowing for civil commitment of 
sexually violent predators in RCW Title 71, a civil chapter of the Revised Code of Washington); 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (finding that “Kansas’ objective to create a civil 
proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the [Sexually Violent Predator] Act within the Kansas 
probate code, instead of the criminal code”). 
366. See, e.g., State v. Catlett, 133 Wash. 2d 355, 375, 945 P.2d 700, 710 (1997) (Sanders, J., 
dissenting) (“RCW 69.50.505 is part and parcel of the controlled substances act, and it is an overtly 
criminal statute which imposes harsh felony penalties for possession and/or distribution of illegal 
drugs.”). 
367. See, e.g., Lowery v. Nelson, 43 Wash. App. 747, 750, 719 P.2d 594, 596 (1986) (“[The] 
government’s right to seize and forfeit . . . vests at the time of the illegal conduct.”). 
368. See supra Part II.  
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defendant has provided ‘the clearest proof’ that ‘the statutory scheme [is] 
so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ 
that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal.”369 When 
Washington courts succinctly state that “[t]he purpose of forfeiture 
proceedings is to punish individuals who participate in the illegal dealing 
of controlled substances,”370 they cannot claim that civil forfeiture laws 
are truly “civil.” 
Because Washington improperly categorizes forfeiture as civil and 
continues to adhere to the “guilty property” legal fiction, its forfeiture 
laws currently rank as some of the worst in the nation.371 Washington’s 
minimal legal protections for property owners are mediocre in comparison 
to New Mexico’s progressive criminal forfeiture laws. New Mexico’s 
forfeiture laws are currently ranked number one in the nation.372 Although 
Washington’s laws do contain some reporting requirements373 and allow 
a successful forfeiture challenger to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees,374 
the low standard of proof, minimal safeguards for property owners, and 
high incentive for profit (through both state forfeiture laws and the ESP) 
render Washington’s civil forfeiture regime in need of major reform.375 
Washington should adopt a criminal forfeiture regime like New 
Mexico’s and prohibit civil asset forfeiture entirely. Interestingly, 
Washington already has a law that requires a criminal conviction before 
property can be forfeited.376 However, because the government can 
choose which statute to seek forfeiture under, the criminal forfeiture 
statute is used much less frequently than civil forfeiture under 
RCW 69.50.505.377 The criminal forfeiture statute mandates that “[n]o 
property may be forfeited under this section until after there has been a 
superior court conviction of the owner of the property for the felony in 
connection with which the property was employed, furnished, or 
acquired.”378 This framework is a start but not enough on its own to protect 
property owners. As the relative rarity of forfeiture under Washington’s 
 
369. Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 19, 857 P.2d at 997 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 
U.S. 364, 369 (1986)). 
370. Valerio v. Lacey Police Dep’t, 110 Wash. App. 163, 176, 39 P.3d 332, 338 (2002) (citing 
Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wash. 2d 376, 378, 721 P.2d 519, 521 (1986)). 
371. See IJ WA, supra note 182.  
372. See IJ NM, supra note 32.  
373. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(8) (2020).  
374. Id. § 69.50.505(6). 
375. See IJ WA, supra note 182. 
376. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.105.010 (2020). 
377. The “Citing References” listed for WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 on Westlaw total 547; the 
“Citing References” for WASH. REV. CODE § 10.105.010 total 49. 
378. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.105.010(1).  
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criminal forfeiture statute shows, law enforcement will continue to 
process forfeitures through the less restrictive civil system unless it is 
declared unconstitutional and replaced with a more protective criminal 
forfeiture statutory scheme. 
Like New Mexico, Washington should reform its laws to always 
require a criminal conviction before a defendant’s property can be 
forfeited. This will prevent innocent owners from losing property under 
the low preponderance standard currently in place and ensure that law 
enforcement uses forfeiture for its stated goals of deterring and punishing 
criminals. If the Supreme Court of Washington can recognize that 
penalizing someone who unknowingly possessed illegal drugs violates 
due process,379 then it should also recognize that permitting the 
government to deprive an individual of their property without having to 
prove a crime has been committed also violates due process. Reforming 
the law to require a criminal conviction or guilty plea and bifurcated 
criminal/forfeiture proceedings will demonstrate that Washington’s 
justice system values individual rights over state agency profit. This 
change will also provide low-income criminal defendants the assistance 
of their assigned counsel at the ancillary forfeiture proceeding, further 
preventing governmental abuse. 
The new forfeiture policy should also require that law enforcement 
agencies deposit proceeds from criminal forfeiture into the state’s general 
fund. This would eliminate improper profit motives while providing 
much-needed resources for Washington schools, because a majority of 
Washington’s general fund is spent on public school education.380 
Directing proceeds to benefit schools would align with the historical 
requirements laid down by the framers of the original Washington 
Constitution of 1889 that said the state’s public education fund “shall be 
derived381 from . . . the proceeds of lands and other property which revert 
to the state by . . . forfeiture,” among other sources.382 The 10% presently 
 
379. See State v. Blake, 197 Wash. 2d 170, 188, 481 P.3d 521, 531 (2021). 
380. See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 495, 269 P.3d 227, 236 (2012) (internal citations 
omitted) (“The state general fund, the largest fund within the state budget, provides the primary means 
for operating the state government. In the 2005–07 biennium, the legislature appropriated 
approximately $11 billion, or 39.7 percent of the state general fund, to support the 295 school districts 
that make up the State’s K-12 system.”). In the 2019–2021 biennium, 51.1% of the state general fund 
was spent on public schools. See OFF. FIN. MGMT., A GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON STATE BUDGET 
PROCESS 6 (2019), https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/legacy/reports/budgetprocess.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8TSB-QNYB]. 
381. The mandatory use of the phrase “shall be derived” was changed to “may be derived” in the 
forty-third amendment to the Washington State Constitution. See S.J. Res. 22, 39th Leg., 
Extraordinary Sess., 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 2817. 
382. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1889) (amended 1965).  
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allocated to the general fund does Washingtonians a double disservice.383 
This provision not only encourages police to forfeit property for their own 
pecuniary gain, but it also deprives schools (as well as other state-funded 
programs) from millions of dollars in revenue every year. Washington can 
ameliorate this issue by requiring agencies to deposit 100% of forfeiture 
proceeds into the general fund.384 
Additionally, Washington lawmakers must be conscientious about 
closing loopholes that would allow state and local agencies to bypass 
Washington forfeiture law through the ESP. Washington agencies 
currently take in millions of dollars in ESP funds every year.385 If agencies 
can continue to bypass state law by transferring seized property to the ESP 
for federal forfeiture, state enacted protections for property owners and 
requirements placed on law enforcement become irrelevant.386 Any new 
legislation must contain a clear directive that the criminal forfeiture laws 
may not be circumvented. 
Finally, Washington legislators should learn from and improve upon 
the identified shortcomings in New Mexico’s criminal forfeiture laws.387 
Any new policy needs to include strict enforcement provisions to ensure 
compliance with the law. There also should be enhanced transparency and 
reporting requirements. Agencies should be required to track multiple data 
points within forfeiture actions, including but not limited to the date of 
property seizure, the seizing agency, the type of property seized, the 
assessed value of the property, the underlying crime connected to the 
seizure, the property owner’s race/ethnicity, the case outcome, and the 
date of property return or transfer of proceeds to the general fund. This 
information should be published annually and easily accessible by the 
public. 
By incorporating the above proposals, Washington would lead the 
nation in civil forfeiture reform. First, property owners would be afforded 
their constitutional right to due process. Second, law enforcement would 
no longer be allowed to funnel property into their department to 
supplement their bottom line. Third, the general fund and Washington 
schools would benefit from a significant revenue increase. Washington’s 
 
383. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(9) (2020).  
384. Similar to New Mexico’s law, costs and fees incurred by law enforcement associated with 
storage and transportation of property should be deducted from the proceeds to reimburse the seizing 
agency. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-7(B) (LexisNexis 2021). 
385. See EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH 2020, supra note 149. 
386. See Stuteville, supra note 78, at 1184 (“[E]ven with state laws that better protect property 
owners, a loophole exists through which state law enforcement agencies can continue to fuel civil 
forfeiture abuse by joining in the federal forfeiture system: equitable sharing.”). 
387. See supra section III.B.2. 
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entire forfeiture system would be more equitable, regulated, and 
transparent. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern civil forfeiture regimes have been repeatedly criticized for 
their lack of constitutional safeguards for property owners and dubious 
profit motives. Justice Clarence Thomas has expressed clear doubt that 
the modern practice of civil forfeiture can withstand a due process claim388 
and the Supreme Court of Washington has cast a wary eye toward 
Washington’s forfeiture laws in dicta.389 In less than ten years, civil 
forfeiture laws across the country have undergone major upheavals as 
many states enact more demanding restrictions in response to these 
criticisms.390 Thus, the future of civil forfeiture appears to be on shaky 
legal ground. This presents a promising opportunity for meaningful 
forfeiture reform in Washington. There has never been a better time for 
Washington to sound the death knell for civil forfeiture and join the states 
who have banned this unjust procedure. 
Criminals should not profit off their wrongdoing. However, that is the 
crux of the argument against civil asset forfeiture—an individual should 
have to be criminally convicted before their property can be forfeited. Law 
enforcement should not be able to permanently deprive anyone of their 
money, vehicle, or home under a mere preponderance standard, without 
ever attempting to bring formal charges. Innocent people like Mr. Rolin 
should not have to battle the government for their own property when they 
have done nothing wrong. The historical application of forfeiture as a 
punishment for piracy has evolved and turned police departments into 
marauding bands of officers searching for a profitable property haul. 
Police are now more akin to modern day pirates than public servants. 
Washington must remedy these abuses by abolishing civil forfeiture. 
Washington should implement a criminal forfeiture system based off New 
Mexico’s model 2015 Act that requires police agencies to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, transfer forfeiture proceeds to the state 
common fund, and follow strict compliance and reporting policies. These 
changes would eliminate any profit motive, comport with the 
 
388. See Leonard v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the 
denial of certiorari).  
389. In both State v. Blake, 197 Wash. 2d 170, 192, 481 P.3d 521, 533 (2021) and City of Sunnyside 
v. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d 600, 617, 398 P.3d 1078, 1085 (2017), the Supreme Court of Washington 
highlighted potential issues with civil forfeiture.  
390. Anne Teigen & Lucia Bragg, Evolving Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES: LEGISBRIEF (Feb. 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/evolving-civil-asset-forfeiture-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5JDB-2YNH].  
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Constitution’s due process requirements, and provide a more equitable 
system for Washington property owners. With a criminal forfeiture 
system, convicted criminals will not profit off their wrongdoing—but 
neither will police profit off “innocent nonconduct.”391 
 
 
391. Blake, 197 Wash. 2d at 188, 481 P.3d at 531.  
